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ABSTRACT 
Herak, Mary, M.A., Summer 1979 Political Science 
"Thought Reform" in China: Political Education for Political 
Change (107 pp.) 
Szu-hsiang kai-tsao—"thought reform"—refers to the official 
Chinese Communist program of political education. It was an 
integral part of the overall attempt to transform China from a 
war-torn, poverty-stricken country incapable of coping with 
Western intervention to a politically aware, technologically 
modernized, self-sufficient nation. The goal of thought reform 
proponents, in particular Mao Tse-tung, was to develop a political 
consciousness in the Chinese people through non-hierarchical, 
humanistic education methods. 
The purposes of this thesis are, first, to indicate to what 
extent the intent of the Chinese Communists corresponded to the 
actual practice of thought reform, that is, to what extent thought 
reform was a process of education rather than indoctrination and 
manipulation; and second, to indicate to what extent it achieved 
the desired class awareness and political consciousness. The pro­
cedure is to examine the historical context, the origins and 
development, and the methods of thought reform through 1959* 
The conclusion of this study is that thought reform was a com­
plex mixture of education and indoctrination processes. Insofar 
as thought reform corresponded to the ideals of education, as it 
frequently did among the peasants, it achieved the inner changes 
sought by its proponents. Insofar as thought reform became a 
tool of indoctrination and manipulation, as it frequently did 
among the intellectuals, it did not achieve the inner changes 
desired by its proponents. 
Director: Professor Richard Allen 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Szu-hsiang kai-tsao"^—"thought reform"—refers to the official 
Chinese Communist program of political education. It was an integral 
part of the overall attempt to transform China from a war-torn, poverty-
stricken country incapable of coping with Western intervention, to a 
politically aware, technologically modernized, self-sufficient nation. 
A blend of political instruction and psychological techniques, thought 
reform was aimed at a gradual and total transformation of the values, 
attitudes and actions of all of the Chinese people. The intent of 
thought reform was to develop a political consciousness in the Chinese 
people through non-hierarchical education processes. This commitment 
to education derived from the traditional Confucian views of human 
2 
nature as basically good, of human beings as basically educable. 
To Westerners, the phrase "thought reform" evokes images of 
"brainwashing" and "mind control." One reason for this is that Western 
definitions of "political" have seldom involved psychological concerns. 
Whether they have to do with Easton1 s "authoritative allocation of 
values,"^ Lasswell's "Who gets what, when, how?"^ or Deutsch's "the 
making of decisions by public means," none approach the all-encompass-
ing Chinese sense of the political. In China, the phrase for "politi­
cal" is pronounced zheng zhi. Zheng means "to straighten or correct." 
Zhi means "to heal or cure." Zheng zhi seems to relate not only to 
the usual governmental processes and institutions, but also to an 
1 
2 
assumption of responsibility for the behavior and growth of individuals. 
It combines Western notions of politics, ethics, education, and self-
transformation. 
This broad perception of the political was not new to Mao Tse-
tung nor to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It had been part of 
Chinese tradition for two thousand years prior to the Chinese Communist 
revolution of 19^9. In Confucian tradition virtue was regarded as the 
foundation of political legitimacy. Moral behavior on the part of the 
ruler, it was believed, would elicit moral behavior on the part of 
those ruled: 
The ancients [i.e., the ancient kings] who wished to cause 
their virtue to shine forth first ordered well their own states. 
Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their 
families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cul­
tivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, 
they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their 
hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. 
Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended 
to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge 
lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, 
their knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being com­
plete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sin­
cere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being 
rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being 
cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families 
being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their 
states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was made 
tranquil and happy. „ m, _ , T .7 
—from The Great Learning 
In practice, this stress on the interconnectedness of personal 
change, virtue, education, and politics meant that only the wealthy 
classes could become involved in political processes, for only they had 
the leisure to pursue self-transformation through education. The great 
majority of the people, who were peasants, were considered capable of 
only narrow, selfish interests, and they were expected to "know their 
g 
place" in the social hierarchy. Filial piety—complete devotion to 
3 
parents—was for twenty centuries the central personal and social expec­
tation for everyone. There were five important relationships in each 
person's life: sovereign-subject, father-son, husband-wife, elder 
9 
brother-younger brother, friend-friend. Confucius believed that if 
all people observed proper conduct on all of these levels, a harmonious 
social order would result."^ Persons who rebelled against the rigid 
role expectations of Confucian culture met with severe suppression. 
Robert J. Lifton, a psychiatrist, believes that this suppression con­
tributed to personal feelings of passivity and powerlessness and to 
political conservatism."^ The depth of the hold of filial piety on 
the Chinese psyche was a constant source of frustration for reformers 
in China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Lifton believes 
that part of the success of the Chinese Communists was that they were 
able to get people to transfer their deep filial feelings to the Com-
12 
munist Party. 
Victor Li, a professor of international law at Stanford Uni­
versity, suggests that a better term for what the Chinese called "thought 
reform" would be "socialization," for the processes involved deal with 
the formation and change of basic outlooks. 
Stripped of emotionalism and of Cold War and other ideological 
rhetoric, the fundamental question is: what must be done to 
get people to act in a particular manner—that is, to have 
people avoid certain "undesirable" actions and undertake cer­
tain other "desirable" ones? Implicit in this question is a 
series of others. In what manner and on what bases are norms 
of behavior determined for a society or group? How are these 
norms communicated to the public? What means are used to get 
a group and its members to adhere to the norms? What happens 
when a person fails to adhere? And finally, what are the 
human and material costs in carrying out this course of 
action?-^ 
Such questions are central to the area of political socialization, which 
I shall refer to as political education. Both terms refer to what Dawson, 
k 
Prewitt, and Dawson define as "the processes through which an individual 
acquires his particular political orientations—his knowledge, feelings, 
and evaluations regarding his political world." They stress the use of 
the word "acquire" in this definition, because it implies an inter­
action between the person being socialized and the agents of socializa-
tion. 
I could also use the term "political indoctrination" to describe 
thought reform processes. I do believe there is a difference between 
education and indoctrination, and it is clear that both processes oc­
curred in China, as in the United States. Education implies a "drawing 
out," as the roots of the word suggest, a "development of latent facul-
1E> 
ties" through the interaction between teacher and learner. Indoctrin­
ation implies a "putting in," a more one-sided approach to learning. 
Specifically political indoctrination is described by Dawson, Prewitt, 
and Dawson as "the learning of a specific political ideology intended 
ILS 
to rationalize and justify a particular regime." They note that too 
often what we call "political education" in the United States is what 
we call "political indoctrination" in other countries. In the interests 
of cross-cultural openness, I will use the term "political education" 
to describe thought reform in the body of this paper, leaving an 
assessment of its content and effect until the conclusion. 
In writing this paper I have used the traditional approaches of 
historical narrative and description. To understand how thought reform 
evolved in China, it is necessary to know how the Communist Party 
evolved; to know how the Communist Party evolved, it is necessary to 
understand certain aspects of Chinese history. Chapter II is an overrv-
view of Chinese history between l8i|0 and 1927 > "the chaotic period which 
5 
gave rise to the emergence of the Chinese Communist Party. Chapters 
III through V are a history and description of thought reform processes 
from their tentative beginnings in the 1920's to their full formulation 
in the 195>0's. In Chapter VI I have discussed some positive and nega­
tive reactions to thought reform and have attempted to assess whether 
or not thought reform processes did broaden the political consciousness 
of the Chinese people in the ways hoped for by the Chinese Communists, 
in particular Mao Tse-tung. 
Researching information about thought reform in China has been 
an exciting project. Pew people describing events in China are able to 
stay emotionally uninvolved. While such descriptions are never boring, 
they do make it difficult to know what to believe. I have tried as 
much as possible, given my own hopes and fears, to sift what facts were 
available from the hopes and fears of the writers. 
6 
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CHAPTER II 
TRANSITIONAL CHAOS AND THE CHINESE RESPONSE—181+0-1927 
The chaotic period between 181+0 and 1949 is generally regarded 
as a transition period, signifying the end of a traditional Confucian 
culture and the beginnings of a modern nation-state. Proponents of 
three competing ideologies—nationalism, Western liberalism, and Com­
munism—tried to establish order and unity in China during that period. 
This chapter will describe the character of the social and political 
chaos of the transition period and its effect on the Chinese people 
through 1927. At that time the Chinese Communist Party and its program 
of thought reform began to emerge as powerful forces for change in China. 
Background 
For several centuries prior to the nineteenth century, conditions 
in China had gradually changed in ways that contributed to large popula­
tion growth. Introduction of hardier crops had enabled the Chinese to 
produce more crops in a greater variety of soils, which had contributed 
to a gradually improved standard of living for the Chinese people. In 
addition to this and other agricultural improvements,"'" the Ch'ing dynasty, 
established in 161+14, was able to achieve a century of peace within China. 
The population is believed to have quadrupled between 1750 and 1850, from 
one hundred million to four hundred million. With that growth, the 
agricultural developments began to prove inadequate to the population. 
One reason for this was a lagging technology. Confucian tradition had 
7 
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promoted such a distance between intellectuals and peasants that no in-
between class of technicians had evolved that might have developed tech­
nology useful to agricultural development. Confucian tradition also 
ruled that upon the death of a father, land was to be divided equally 
among all of his sons. Farms thus became smaller and less productive 
with each generation. China had no substantial urban industry to which 
surplus rural laborers might have been rechanneled, and growing rural 
unrest resulted. Officials throughout China found it safer to stand by 
and hope for change than to actively promote reforms. To act would have 
meant to risk failure, and by Confucian standards failure was sure proof 
of loss of political legitimacy, of "the Mandate of Heaven." This 
absence of active leadership led to bureaucratic corruption, which in-
3 
evitably meant excessive taxation of the peasants. 
Corruption and often cruelty on the part of officials, landlords, 
and merchants; difficulties connected with increasing population and 
decreasing food supplies; and natural disasters such as floods, famine, 
and disease—all contributed to widespread banditry and rebellion.^ 
Nineteen Century Rebellion 
Corruption and rebellion against corruption were not new to 
nineteenth century China, of course. Secret societies had frequently 
developed around religious movements throughout Chinese history, and 
often these had become underground rebel organizations in opposition to 
bureaucratic corruption. Many of these continued to be active in the 
last half of the nineteenth century. A few led major rebellions. 
The Taiping Rebellion was the largest and bloodiest of the nine­
teenth century rebellions. Begun by a Chinese Christian visionary who 
9 
had organized a group called the "God Worshippers" Society, the group 
attracted the support of enormous numbers and varieties of people. The 
founder proposed a new dynasty, called the T'ai-p'ing, or "Great Peace," 
to replace the corrupt Ch'ing dynasty. Between l8f>0 and 1861+ the 
Taiping forces took control of almost half of China. They won support 
by carrying their own food and supplies and by treating the peasants 
with respect wherever they went. They banned gambling, drugs, witch­
craft, and prostitution, ended the footbinding of women, and encouraged 
women to fight and take leadership positions. They proposed a system 
of land reform but were unable to retain power long enough to put it 
into effect. The rebellion was crushed in I86I4. It was estimated that 
twenty million lives were lost during the Taiping era. The Taiping 
Rebellion is of special interest because many of the reforms begun or 
attempted by its leadership were eventually put into effect even more 
successfully by the Chinese Communists. 
A major reason for the Taiping defeat was Western intervention 
in support of the Ch'ing government. This was significant because it 
was the first break with neutrality by the English and the French, and 
even more so because it was the first time in history that the Chinese 
government had admitted the superiority of foreign powers.^ 
Western Intervention After I8I4.O 
Modem China's difficulties with the West had begun in I8I+O-I8I4.2, 
7 
when Britain defeated China in the Opium War. That war had resulted 
when a Chinese official had tried to prevent British attempts to take 
Q 
opium into major coastal cities. The British had used a type of boat, 
armed with swivel cannons, previously unknown to the Chinese. Many 
10 
Chinese recognized at the time that they were dealing with a more 
powerful military technology. No official move was made to learn that 
technology until twenty years later, however, largely because of the 
9 widespread traditional attitudes of disdain for non-Chinese ideas. 
Defeat by the British cost the Chinese the city of Hong Kong, 
plus an agreement to open several port cities to British trade and 
residence. This marked the beginning of the unequal treaty system 
between China and various Western powers,"^ and the beginning of a 
drive to open China to direct Western intervention. Western ideas, 
institutions, and methods of industrialization gradually entered China, 
mainly in the coastal areas."'"''' This served to add to the resentment 
felt by many of the Chinese people toward the West, especially in the 
12 
court of the Ch'ing ruler, the dowager empress. 
Not a lot of attention was given to stopping the Western intru­
sion during the next fifty years, because the dynasty was absorbed with 
other internal and external problems. To crush two major rebellions 
the central government had encouraged the provincial leaders to form 
regional armies. This was done, but it had served to further weaken 
the central government, because the provincial leaders had continued to 
13 
build up private armies from the huge numbers of unemployed. Japan 
added to the central government's problems when it wrested control of 
Korea from China in 1894."'"^ This defeat was used by Germany, France, 
Britain, and Russia as an opportunity to divide China into "spheres of 
influence." While theoretically leaving China independent of foreign 
control, it established de facto control by these countries over the 
15 
political and economic decisions within their respective areas. 
11 
In 1898, when the Ch'ing regime seemed to he losing all legiti­
macy, reform attempts were made by the new emperor, nephew of the 
empress."^ Although the moderate reforms proposed still allowed the 
sovereign nearly -unlimited powers, it was seen as a threat by the 
17 
empress and other conservative officials. Though supposedly in 
retirement, the empress still controlled the military. She had most 
x3 
of the reformers executed, and her nephew and the rest fled to Japan. 
19 
What has come to be known in the West as the Boxer Rebellion 
was the last attempt at political change in nineteenth century China. 
It was supported by the empress and the imperial court and was directed 
against Westerners in China. Its suppression by the Western powers 
resulted in the humiliating Boxer Protocol of 1901, which included pay­
ment of a huge indemnity and the granting of special privileges to 
eleven foreign nations. For political reasons, the foreign powers 
20 
supported the empress as a figurehead ruler until her death in 1908. 
The 1911 Revolution 
The Ch'ing dynasty was finally overthrown in 1911 by a revolu­
tionary movement led by a Chinese intellectual of peasant, Christian 
21 
background, Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Sun had organized anti-Ch'ing forces 
beginning in I89I+. Considered an outlaw by the regime, much of his 
revolutionary activity had been done in disguise with the help of secret 
societies. He had personally organized the "Revive China" Society, 
which had grown rapidly, and he had been able to make allies of many 
officers of the imperial army. In 1905 he issued the Three Principles 
of the People—"Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood." He 
united his secret society with others, named the new organization the 
12 
"Together Sworn" Society, and called for land reform and for the estab-
22 
lishment of a republic of China. 
While Sun organized, other movements for change were also having 
impact. One of these was led by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, one of the intellec­
tuals who had escaped to Japan with the young emperor. He had continued 
his activism and published the New Citizen, a journal that called for 
liberal reforms. He asserted that the Confucian tradition of filial 
piety should be reinterpreted in light of historical changes, and that 
the state should replace the emperor as the object of filial devotion. 
He called for a benevolent monarchy that would introduce widespread 
education, a Western-style legal system, and provincial and national 
assemblies supportive of local self-government. He formed a political 
23 
party in Yokohama that supported gradual change through reform. 
The empress did finally attempt a few reforms before her death, 
but these proved inadequate and only served to hasten the fall of the 
dynasty. One such reform was the abolition of the ancient Confucian 
examination system for officials, which was effected in 1905. New 
schools were established, and students were encouraged to study abroad. 
Thousands went to Japan for an education modeled on the Western system, 
and many returned with a new critical awareness to participate in the 
Chinese bureaucracy. The exposure to new ideas also resulted in a 
rapid expansion of Sun Yat-sen's secret society. Another such reform 
was the establishment of a constitutional commission. The commission 
proposed a constitutional system like that of Japan, and a cabinet 
system was begun in 1906. Consultative assemblies were established in 
each province in 1909. Rather than assist the dynasty, however, these 
assemblies became centers for radical agitation. The reorganization of 
13 
the army was another attempt at change that eventually backfired, for 
in the process of change the army became more loyal to the official in 
a| 
charge of the change than to the central government. 
Throughout this period, Sun Yat-sen's organization made eleven 
different attempts to overthrow the government. An uprising in 1911 
finally triggered uprisings throughout the country, and control was 
taken of several provincial governments. Sun, who was in the United 
States at the time, returned to become the first President of the Chin­
ese Republic. 
The forces that brought Sun to power were not politically united. 
His organization, which supported a strong central government, had of 
necessity allied itself with another organization which strongly advo­
cated provincial economic autonomy. This latter group had been willing 
to support a strong central government on a temporary basis because of 
desperate circumstances in the provinces. Sun's leadership was thus 
more in name than fact. China was in turmoil and needed leadership that 
could unify the country and establish order. Believing that he was not 
that type of leader, Sun stepped down soon after his inauguration, to 
26 
be replaced by Yuan Shih-k'ai, the military leader who had won the 
27 
loyalty of the imperial army when it was reorganized. Recognizing 
that Yuan's power rested on his military backing, Sun insisted that Yuan 
28 
agree to work with and be responsible to a parliament and cabinet. 
In spite of Yuan's reluctant promise to Sun, the new regime was 
not so different from the regime it had replaced. It relied mainly on 
29 
the army for support and utilized the existent and corrupt bureaucracy. 
Several political parties did emerge during this period, however, some 
I k  
supporting Yuan unconditionally and others only on condition of his 
30 
willingness to work with the Parliament. 
Tension arose immediately between Yuan and the Parliament, which 
31 
included many from Sun's organization. Yuan, who had never really 
understood the new notions of parliament and political parties, soon re­
sorted to what he did understand. He put his supporters in the cabinet, 
ignored the constitution, and dissolved the Parliament. He attempted 
to become emperor in 1915> but was successfully resisted. He died in 
32 
1916. Three different, but equally unstable, military leaders held 
33 
office in the next three years. Sun, meanwhile, had decided it was 
futile to try to impose a Western parliamentary system on China. He 
went underground in 1911| and organized a revolutionary party, the Kuo-
"3 J 
mintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party. 
1911-1919—Pressures for Change 
John King Fairbank points out that during the years between 1911 
and 1921, three important developments occurred in China that were rele­
vant to the increasing demands for social and political change. First, 
the weakened central government continued to give rise to autonomous 
provincial governments. Second, World War I loosened the hold of for­
eign powers on China's economy. This "breathing space" permitted a 
rapid expansion of Chinese industry. Third, the Chinese people were 
roused to the beginnings of a nationalist consciousness through an ag^-
35 
gression by Japan in 1915- This section will briefly discuss how 
each of these developments intensified the straggles for political 
dominance in China. 
The autonomous provincial governments that arose were controlled 
by "warlords," military leaders who had allied with the local landlords 
15 
to seize economic and military control of an area.- While the warlords 
made much money from opium and gun smuggling and through direct nego-
tiations with foreign banks, most of their income was taken from the 
peasants through taxes. The landlords and warlords often demanded the 
peasants' animals, equipment, and labor power, in return for which the 
peasants received no compensation. The landlords raised rents, loaned 
money at high interest rates, and gradually squeezed the peasants off 
the land, forcing them to become tenant farmers or beggars. Banditry 
plagued the provinces as many displaced peasants devised their own 
methods of survival. Military mutinies by soldiers in the warlord 
armies were frequent. This instability added to the desperate situation 
of the peasants, who never knew what new tyranny awaited them. Tax col-
37 
lectors and soldiers were notorious for their abuse of the peasants. 
As the gentry class grew increasingly wealthy, much of their 
oo 
money was put into the development of industry in the coastal areas. 
The loosening of foreign control over the Chinese economy caused by 
World War I permitted rapid industrial development, the growth of in-
39 
dustrial cities, and the accompanying growth of an industrial working 
class. Working conditions were hard, filthy, and unsafe. Wages per­
mitted bare survival. Accidents were common. Women and children formed 
a large portion of the workers, and they routinely worked twelve or 
thirteen hours a day. The workers protested regularly through strikes 
Although industrial labor was not widespread in China, and although it 
brought with it many new problems, it did offer an alternative to the 
agricultural way of life. It weakened tradition by allowing men and 
women to work outside the Confucian family system. The concept of filial 
piety began to take a back seat to demands for rapid social change.^" 
16 
As industrial towns and cities grew, so did a new merchant class. 
Known as compradores, this group first developed in the treaty ports in 
service to the foreign capitalists, and eventually developed wealth 
through speculation and trade.^ They increasingly came to resent both 
the privileges granted the foreigners through the treaty system and the 
economic limitations caused by warlord control of the provinces. This 
new merchant class thus became a political force for strong central 
government and national independence. They hoped thereby to control 
the warlords and foreign capitalists, and, among other benefits, to 
) *3 
increase their own wealth and power. 
Aggression by Japan added to the growing national consciousness. 
Japan had entered World War I with the Allies . In 1915 Japan invaded 
China under the pretext of seizing German possessions. In a secret 
agreement, Japan presented China with the brazen "Twenty-one Demands," 
which called for Japanese control of several areas, institutions, and 
industries in China. The Chinese intellectuals were outraged and 
humiliated when Yuan, still in power at that time, agreed to the 
demands.^ Huge protest demonstrations occurred throughout China.^ 
Meanwhile, Sun Yat-sen had allied his revolutionary party with 
numerous members of Parliament, various southern warlords, and the 
Chinese navy. He established a military government in Canton in 1917» 
in opposition to the Peking government. He soon recognized that once 
again he was but a figurehead, with the real control held by conserva­
tive military leaders who had Western support. He resigned in 1918.^ 
The New Tide Movement 
All of these events served to accelerate intellectual ferment 
in China. As mentioned earlier, the educational reforms of the empress 
17 
had, over the years, given rise among the gentry to a new scholar class 
(students, doctors, lawyers, engineers, and others) educated in Western-
style schools. The failure of the 1911 revolution to effect significant 
change had caused increasing numbers of these students and intellectuals 
to analyze the reasons for its failure, and to look for broader theories 
of change. Many were attracted to Marxism.^ 
A movement that had great influence in China in 1915-1920 was 
the "New Tide" or "Renaissance" Movement, which stressed self-expres­
sion and considered the tradition of filial piety to be the cause of 
China's troubles. Participants encouraged active political involve­
ment. They published a magazine called The New Youth in 1915» in which 
they called for an end to traditional passivity and status-seeking and 
challenged young people—both men and women—to be strong, proud, inde­
pendent," patriotic, and devoted to high ideals. The leaders of the 
New Tide identified democracy and science as the answer to China's 
) ft 
problems, and they called for a vernacular written language that 
U9 would permit universal literacy in China. The ideas that circulated 
during this period had a profound effect on the thinking of the young 
people who were to become leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
near future. One of the many study groups that were formed during this 
period was the New People's Study Society, formed by the young Mao Tse-
tung in 1918.^ 
This new intellectual radicalism in China, in spite of its 
51 
intensity, affected only a small minority of the Chinese people. 
The biggest influence of the Chinese youth movement was felt in the 
52 
May Fourth Movement of 1919• 
18 
1919—The May Fourth Movement 
Early in May of 1919 word spread through China via telegraph 
that World War I had ended and that a treaty had been signed in Ver­
sailles. Instead of restoring control over Germany's "sphere of 
influence" to China, the Westerners had transferred those privileges to 
Japan, in the hopes of preventing the spread of Communism in Asia. News 
of the Versailles decision incensed the Chinese intellectuals. On May i| 
thousands of students in Peking organized a massive protest demonstra-
53 
tion against Japan and against pro-Japanese officials. 
The students marched through the streets of Peking, burned the 
house of one official and beat up another. The police attacked the 
5U students, which triggered a student strike. The students organized 
55 
the Peking Students' Union to coordinate the protest movement. They 
56 
sent telegrams to students in other parts of China, and strikes and 
demonstrations and the formation of students' unions spread. The press 
in general, and most liberals in China, supported the demonstrations. 
In June, the Peking government proclaimed martial law. Japanese 
marines entered the port cities to show support for the regime. Mer­
chants in Shanghai responded immediately by closing their shops and 
calling for a general strike. Shanghai industrial workers also went 
on strike. Soon merchants and workers in many other towns joined in. 
The government finally responded, freeing jailed demonstrators and re­
jecting the Treaty of Versailles. This ended the strikes and demonstra­
tions, but a boycott of Japanese goods continued through the summer, 
which seriously damaged Japan's market in China. 
Many more radical student groups were formed as a result of the 
May Fourth Movement, and more radical periodicals were published. One 
19 
of the new periodicals was the Xiang River Review, published by the 
Hunan Students' Association, of which Mao Tse-tung was a leader. These 
publications were opposed to traditional values, especially the concept 
of filial piety, and supportive of women's rights. They continued the 
demand for a vernacular language. They proposed communal living. They 
encouraged intellectuals to go into the country to educate the peasants. 
They absorbed and promoted progressive ideas from around the world. 
The May Fourth outbreak caught the people in power in China 
completely by surprise. A spontaneous outburst that was well-coordin­
ated by ad hoc groups of students, merchants, and workers, the movement 
had none of the usual organizational backing. Even Sun Yat-sen's 
Kuomintang was drawn into the protest after the fact. The May Fourth 
Movement was the first solid indication of a widespread, profound 
division in the political realm. Under the banner of "save the country," 
it attacked, for the first time in Chinese history, both the foreign 
presence in China and the traditional political structure. Although no 
immediate changes in the Chinese government resulted, the movement did 
<7 
signify a new political awareness in China. 
1919-1921—Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party 
The unpopularity of the central government continued to grow 
after 1919> even though a new military clique took power in 1920. The 
new leadership made some attempts at reconciliation with the students 
and workers, but it had no program for genuine change. This inadequacy 
was made even more visible by the situation in the provinces. 
The provincial warlords had deliberately ignored the declaration 
in 1917 that outlawed the growth and sale of opium. Many had demanded 
20 
that the peasants in their region grow opium instead of their much-
needed rice crops. The warlords then had collected the opium for "taxes" 
and sold it at great profit. In addition, a famine in north China in 
1920-1921 crushed millions of peasants. Hundreds of thousands starved. 
People were forced to eat their draft animals and sell their children 
to survive. The central government proved unable to assist in any way. 
In 1920 Sun Yat-sen returned to Canton with his revolutionary 
party, the Kuomintang. He allied himself with a provincial general, 
and together they reclaimed the Canton government. Sun's goal was to 
support the popular federalist movement in various southern provinces, 
thus building up a base of support that would enable him to resume the 
58 
national presidency. In 1922, however, his warlord ally took over the 
59 
southern government, and Sun was once again forced to step down. 
Meanwhile, Marxism was increasingly becoming recognized as an 
exciting new ideology by many Chinese intellectuals. Communist liter­
ature had just become available in translation, and many study groups 
had formed to analyze it.^ Some of these groups considered forming 
active political organizations; others wanted to use Marxism as a tool 
for more abstract educational purposes. The Chinese were extremely im­
pressed when the new Soviet government renounced all privileges that the 
old treaty system had granted to Russia, and they were even more im­
pressed when the Russians offered to support China in attempts to remove 
the other foreign powers.^ 
The Comintern, the International Communist organization, sent a 
delegate to meet with Chinese intellectuals interested in forming a 
Communist Party in China. A diverse group met with the delegate in 
Shanghai in the summer of 1920 and formed the first Chinese Communist 
21 
cell.^ The Shanghai group published a periodical, started a Socialist 
Youth Corps, and began organizing industrial workers. Similar small 
Communist groups soon formed in other cities. One of these, in Changsha, 
65 
included Mao Tse-tung. 
Chinese historians now list July 1921 as the official beginning 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), possibly because the earlier 
groups were not particularly unified in their understanding of Comnrunist 
ideology. Twelve delegates attended the July meeting in Shanghai, 
representing seven of the previously formed groups. They set up a 
provincial party headquarters in Shanghai and assigned responsibility 
66 
for other provincial offices to various members. 
In accordance with Marxist theory, the first project of the CCP 
was to support industrial workers' struggles and to organize labor 
unions. They set up evening classes for the laborers and began trans-
67 
lating Communist literature. The Chinese Communists modeled themselves 
after the Russian Communists. They studied Party documents, adopted 
democratic centralism as a method of organization, demanded discipline 
and obedience of their members, and utilized the techniques of propa­
ganda and agitation in their organization efforts. The stress on 
criticism and personal confession that was to eventually become part 
68 
of thought reform was first learned from the Russian Communists. 
The First United Front 
China in 1921 was deeply in debt to Western powers and to Japan, 
both from the Boxer indemnity and from numerous loans. Westerners con­
trolled Chinese finances and deposited huge profits directly into foreign 
banks. Westerners who lived in China were not considered to be under 
22 
the jurisdiction of Chinese courts, nor did they pay nearly the taxes 
the Chinese had to pay. Christian missions had flourished in China 
under the watchful eyes of the Western powers, and missionaries gener­
ally partook of the privileges granted all foreigners. The subtle and 
not-so-subtle attitudes of superiority exhibited by Westerners toward 
69 
Chinese were an ongoing source of resentment. 
For the Chinese peasants, the conditions described earlier only 
worsened. Many rebelled. They rebelled by leaving their villages to 
seek work in the cities; by joining the armies of opposition warlords; 
by becoming bandits. They rebelled by beating and killing tax collec­
tors; by burning landlords' houses; by joining secret societies; by 
turning to superstitious beliefs and practices. For the most part, 
their rebellion was not against the traditional system, but against 
what they considered to be injustices within that system. Only with 
Communist participation in peasant rebellions did the great majority of 
peasants begin to understand the broader political context of their 
70 
misery. This was true for the rebelling industrial workers as well. 
The Communists helped organize trade unions and supported numerous 
strikes in 1921-1922. Violent suppression of those strikes, however, 
demonstrated to the Communists the need for broadening alliances as 
71 
quickly as possible. 
The Nationalists (Sun's KMl) and the Communists were brought 
72 
together by the Russian Communists in I92I4. Between 1919 and- 1923 
Soui had become totally disillusioned with Western liberalism and had 
73 
begun to consider an alliance with Russia. In 1923> troops in Canton 
overthrew the warlord leader and asked Sun to return. He did so, and 
sent a group of Nationalists, including Chiang Kai-shek, to Russia to 
23 
get political advice. The Soviet Communists, seeing the large size of 
the KMT and the possibilities for its continued growth, encouraged the 
CCP and the KMT to work together.^ 
In general, members of the CCP and the KMT did not trust one 
another. Though in agreement in their opposition to foreign imperial­
ism, they were sharply divided on domestic objectives. The Communists, 
who supported a workers' revolution, seemed too radical to the Nation^ 
alists, who had strong ties to the wealthy classes and wanted modern-
75 
ization along Western lines under moderate Chinese leadership. By 
I92J4, however, both groups had come to see the useful possibilities of 
an alliance. The Communists were interested in added strength; the 
Nationalists were interested in the energy and organizing skills of the 
77 Communists. 
A United Front was agreed upon in 192i|.. The Communists merged 
with the KMT, but maintained an independent Communist Party on the 
side. Their common bonds were national unity and anti-imperialism. 
The Communists were allowed to occupy some of the leadership positions, 
ryO 
and one of these was filled by Mao Tse-tung. The KMT armies were 
79 
restructured under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, with the assis-
80 
tance of Russian advisers and weapons. The new unity had a much 
8l 
broader appeal than either group had had independently. It took 
control of the Canton area and roused the populace to an enthusiastic 
militancy.^ 
Mao soon went to Shanghai, where he developed a plan for the 
complete restructuring of the Nationalist Party. He criticized the 
separation of working people and bureaucrats, and of city and country. 
21+ 
He proposed a training program for cadres,* which resulted in the forma­
tion of a Peasant Department within the KMT structure. The Communists 
were put in charge of a training institute for peasant cadres. 
Mao's close work with the KMT led to a general disillusionment 
with the condescending attitudes he observed in its members. He pro­
posed to the Communist Party that it organize its own peasant training 
programs throughout China, especially in the provinces. The Communists 
were not, for the most part, enthusiastic about his concern with the 
peasants. They held to the Marxist teaching that industrial workers 
were the main revolutionary force. In January 1925 > Mao returned to 
his home in Hunan province. He studied the situation there for seven 
O I 
months and organized the first peasant Party branch. He began to 
realize that the Marxist concept of working class would have to be 
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adapted to correspond to Chinese realities. Until then, Chinese 
Communist organizing had revolved around urban workers in the indus­
trialized cities on the eastern coast. The vast peasant majority had 
not been taken into account. The reason for this was that the Communists 
had rigidly interpreted Marx, who had believed that only industrial 
workers were in a position to develop the political consciousness neces­
sary for revolution. Marx believed that the position of the workers in 
the labor process was so oppressed, that they had everything to gain by 
revolution, and he believed that the labor process itself had taught 
*In Chinese, the word used for cadre is "kanpu" which means 
"backbone personnel." "Cadre" in China referred to individuals who 
accept the responsibility of ongoing political activity and organiza­
tion, whether in the Party or the government. See William Hinton, 
Fanshen (New York, Random House, Vintage Books, 1966), p. 12n. 
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the industrial workers the discipline and methods of organization that 
were necessary to carrying out a revolution. Mao realized that the 
Marxist theory would have to be expanded to include peasants if it was 
86 
to be applicable to China, a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country. 
The major question for Mao thus became one of education: how 
could the Communists recruit, discipline, and transform the peasants, 
Q ly 
the rebels, and the bandits of the rural provinces? His answer to 
that question was formulated over the next twenty-five years, through 
much trial and error. 
While Mao was in Hunan, two events occurred that greatly af­
fected the future of Communism in China. One was that Sun Yat-sen died. 
The other was a massive demonstration on May 30, 1925, at the Kuangchow 
International Settlement protesting the killing of a Chinese worker by 
a Japanese foreman. British soldiers fired into the crowd of demon­
strators, killing twelve. One month later the British fired into 
another crowd of demonstrators, killing fifty-six. Anti-imperialist 
protests, strikes, and battles swept through China. Membership in the 
8 
Communist Party mushroomed, much to the alarm of right-wing KM1 members. 
While Sun had lived, the anti-Communist elements within the KMT 
had been kept in control. They surfaced after his death, however, and 
89 
actively agitated for expulsion of the Communists from the KMT. Over 
the next two years, the KMT became increasingly militaristic and con­
servative. Chiang Kai-shek rose to power during that period. Although 
he mistrusted the Communists, he realized he needed their support to win 
90 
peasants and workers to his struggle. 
Siui's goal had been to overcome warlord domination in northern 
China. To generate support for a northern expedition, the United Front 
26 
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had organized mass meetings throughout China. Mao had supported this 
by organizing among the peasants, whom he had come to see as an all-
powerful force for change: 
In a very short time . . . several hundred million peasants 
will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so 
swift and powerful that no power, however great, will be able 
to hold it back. . . . There are three alternatives. To march 
at their head and lead them? To trail behind them gesticu­
lating and criticizing? Or to stand in their way and oppose 
them? Every Chinese is free to choose, but events will force 
you to make the decision quickly.92 
In 1926 Mao finally succeeded in establishing the Peasant Depart­
ment he had promoted earlier, this time within the Communist Party. It 
provided training for cadres willing to work with the peasants, offered 
support to peasants' unions throughout China, and generated support 
93 
among the peasants for the KMT Northern Expedition which was to come. 
9I1 
The peasants' unions expanded to include millions of families. 
William Hinton mentions some of the reasons Mao viewed the 
political training of the peasants as a necessity. The situation of the 
peasants as small-scale landholders in a competitive economic system 
kept peasant families divided from other peasant families, which kept 
them from organizing in any long-term way against their class oppressors. 
The extreme isolation of the rural villages had contributed to a lack of 
a vision of new political alternatives, which contributed to much mis­
directed violence when the peasants did rebel. Mao was in complete 
sympathy with the desire of the peasants for change, but wanted their 
change attempts to be more effective than they had proven in the past. 
95> 
For this he saw political education as essential. 
The Northern Expedition of the Nationalist Army began in July 
1926. Chiang was hailed as a national hero. He promised to overcome 
27 
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the warlords, expel the imperialists, and -unify China. The troops 
received enormous support from the peasants and workers wherever they 
went. Many victories were won before the Army even arrived. This 
peasant/worker activity alarmed many in the KMT, both because it repre­
sented an uncontrollable force, and because the KMT members had finan-
97 
cial and family ties to the landlord-gentry class. Wherever the KM? 
won a victory, therefore, it did not arm the workers and initiate 
reforms. Instead, it asked the people to sacrifice, to work harder, 
98 
and to postpone further unionization. This caused tension between 
many of the Communists and the right wing of the KMT, who were in con-
99 
trol at the time. 
The Nationalists, led by Chiang Kai-shek, decided by 1927 that 
the time had come to separate with the CCP. Warlords and imperialists 
were being driven out, and the militant peasants and workers had begun 
to appear more threatening than helpful.The Communists and workers 
in Shanghai had taken control of that city and awaited the arrival of 
the KMT Army. The Nationalists, allied with wealthy merchants, bankers, 
and opium racketeers, attacked the city instead. The unarmed workers 
were massacred. Communists escaped or were killed. Thereafter, Com­
munism and unionism were outlawed by the Nationalists,'^"'" and one 
hundred thousand people were killed in that province over the next 
102 
year. 
By late 1928 Chiang's armies had taken control of the central 
government in Peking and resituated it in Nanking. Foreign nations 
recognized the Nationalist government as the official regime and turned 
over their control of tariffs and customs. They also gave up some of 
28 
their treaty privileges. In spite of this foreign support, the expulsion 
of the Communists had sapped the revolutionary energy of the KMT. Now 
composed mainly of conservatives who viewed maintenance of power their 
main task, the KM? proved incapable of making fundamental social and 
political changes. 
Meanwhile, Mao and other Communists who had escaped the 1927 
massacre had fled to the mountains of southeast China. Freed of the 
United Front, they began the long struggle that was to lead to their 
victory in 191+9 
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CHAPTER III 
THE BEGINNINGS OP THOUGHT BEFOEM—1927-1936 
Outlawed by the KMT in 1927, Mao and many other Communists es­
caped into the mountains and began to form an army."'" Peasants, workers, 
and bandits joined their ranks. Mao's first movement in the direction 
of educating the recruits was to explain to them the broader historical 
perspective of their struggles and to project for them new possibilities 
for change. The second step toward education involved organization, a 
process of restructuring the Communist Party and building a Red Army. 
According to Han Suyin: 
[Mao] organized the Party cell at company level, and emphasized 
the building of the Red Army as a political force by inaugurating 
a Party group in each squad, a cell in each company, and a com­
mittee in each battalion. Each committee consisted of seven to 
nine men, ordinary soldiers. Among them one, two or three were 
Party members. Mao called the latter (most of them were trained 
by him) "instructor delegates," for they were to educate the 
soldiers, keep up their political consciousness and morale. 
They were to maintain discipline, train the Army in work among 
the people, in mass propaganda.2 
Mao believed the Army should have two roles. The first was 
political education, the second was military struggle. To successfully 
assume these two roles, Mao believed, each soldier must be treated well 
first. He established committees of soldiers at each military level to 
give special attention to the welfare of the soldiers. 
Through this reorganization the Army and the Party became in­
separable. The Party's role was to oversee the Army's political behavior 
and direction, and one of the Army's roles was to train and discipline 
Partv cadres. 
3k 
Mao laid down basic rules for the Army—officers would receive 
the same pay as soldiers, officers could not beat the soldiers, and 
soldiers had the right to criticize the officers. Army accounts were 
to be available to inspection by civilians. 
Mao also laid down rules of behavior toward the peasantry. The 
soldiers were to treat the peasants with respect. They were to enter 
no homes nor take anything from the peasants. Anything borrowed was to 
be returned, anything purchased was to be fairly priced. 
Many recruits were angered by the rules, which were nearly un­
heard of in Chinese military experience. Mao's response was that they 
could stay or leave, but if they stayed the rules had to be obeyed. 
This mild response in itself was a surprise to the soldiers, who were 
used to authoritarian harshness. 
The approach of the Red Army to a village often followed a 
familiar pattern. The villagers, expecting the worst, would flee into 
the mountains before the troops arrived. After a couple of days ob­
servers would spread the word that the soldiers were not robbing, burn­
ing, nor even using their houses. The peasants would hesitantly return 
to their homes. Meetings would be held to assure the people that the 
Army was at their service, and sometimes possessions confiscated from 
landlords were distributed. In response, the peasants often shared 
their rice with the soldiers, and many of them joined the Army. 
Another rule was developed as the Army won military victories: 
the soldiers were told not to kill the captured enemy. No one, whether 
bandit, beggar, or enemy soldier, was to be denied the possibility of 
3 
of reeducation, which Mao called political training. A system of edu­
cation and land reform won further peasant support.^ 
35 
Meanwhile, among the Communists who had gone underground in the 
cities, a new leadership had evolved. Convinced that Mao was mistaken 
in his notions of organizing a base in the mountains, they had removed 
him from his official position of Party leadership. In contrast to 
Mao, they promoted continuous militancy and violence toward all land­
lords and rich and middle peasants.^ 
Mao did not hear word of this development until the following 
year. By that time he had found his own method of operation to be suc­
cessful, so he continued it. While the Communists in the cities turned 
to robbing banks and assassinating enemies, the Communists in the moun-
7 tains were evolving a radically different program of change. 
Life in the mountains that first winter of 1927-1928 was ex­
tremely difficult. Pood and clothing were scarce. In spite of their 
difficulties, however, Mao's Red Army won six counties. During the 
first military action, landlords and some rich and middle peasants were 
8 9 
killed. Mao always regretted this action, for he saw that it turned 
10 
potential allies (the rich and middle peasants) into enemies. He 
tried to teach the soldiers that destroying human lives was not the 
same as destroying a class. Destroying a class, he believed, involved 
property reforms and reeducation."^ The Army was thereafter instructed 
to take only from the landlords. The hoarded grain and possessions taken 
from landlords were to be put in a central location and shared with the 
peasants.^"2 
In general, middle peasants owned some land, and rich peasants 
owned enough land to hire laborers. See Jean Chesneaux, Prancoise Le 
Barbier, and Marie-Claire Bergere, China: From the 1911 Revolution to 
Liberation, trans. Paul Aster and Lydia Davis, chaps. 1-3 trans. Anne 
Destenay (New York: Random House, Pantheon Books, 1977), P« 113' 
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Mao believed that revolutionary action must involve active par-
ticipation by the peasants in the processes that were changing their 
lives, both to give them a sense of their own strength and to provide 
the Army with necessary information and strength for its military 
13 
actions. In each county taken by the Communists, therefore, a program 
of land reform was begun, and local governments were established. The 
peasants were organized into peasants' organizations, and mass meetings 
were held to elect representatives to the local government. Communist 
Party committees (called soviets) were organized in each locale, each 
with its own council of workers, peasants, and soldiers. In spite of 
the popularity of the Army, the peasants feared retaliation by the KMT. 
In response to this fear, the Communists organized peasant militias for 
defense. 
Political and military courses were held in the mountains to 
train cadres and soldiers. These included basic reading and writing 
lessons. In February of 1928 the Army members were sent into the 
fields to help the peasants plant their crops. They also planted pre­
viously untilled land for themselves. These continued to be the poli­
cies of the Red Army—to be economically self-sufficient and to work 
with and teach the peasants. That first spring they built a small 
hospital and taught courses in health and sanitation. A doctor trained 
15 
sixteen Army cadres in basic medicine. 
In 1928, basic rules for the Army were officially established. 
There were three rules: 
l) Obey orders in all your actions. 
2; Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the 
masses. ^ 
(3) Turn in everything you have captured. 
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There were eight additional guidelines: 
(1) Speak politely to the people. 
(2) Pay fairly for what you buy. 
f3) Return everything you borrow. 
(I4) Pay for anything you damage. 
(5) Replace all doors [used by the knsy as beds] and return 
all straw you sleep on. 
(6) Dig latrines away from houses and fill them with earth 
when you leave. 
7) Do not take liberties with women. 
8) Do not ill-treat captives.^7 
These were memorized and sung by the Red Army as they marched. 
In the spring of 1928, an Army-Party committee was established. 
Its purpose was to educate new troops and recruits as they arrived at 
the Chingkang mountain base. New soldiers' committees were set up as 
new people arrived. The education program included basic reading, 
writing, and arithmetic. The ground was used for their tablets, and 
sticks were used for pencils. Political education included an histori­
cal analysis of their struggle; discussions of ways of organizing people, 
of developing leadership, and of propagandizing enemy troops; public 
speaking; and singing. The educational process involved debate and 
discussion, with freedom to criticize any aspect of their situation, 
18 
including each other and officers. 
In the summer of 1928 the Communist Party Central Committee sent 
representatives to the mountain base with military directives. These 
were obeyed, but they led to disastrous defeats and to the demoraliza­
tion of the troops. Mao analyzed the situation and called for a "rec­
tification"—a complete shake-up of the Party organization. He insisted 
especially on the need for patient, ongoing political education programs 
among the people: "The evil feudal practice of arbitrary dictation is 
so deeply rooted in the minds of the people and even of the ordinary 
Party members that it cannot be swept away at once; when anything comes 
38 
up, they choose the easy way and have no liking for this bothersome 
19 
democratic system. . . ." Mao insisted that one-third of the Army be 
Party members, hoping that a political awareness would thus permeate the 
troops. He also insisted that land redistribution only include land 
owned by the landlords. Property of rich and middle peasants and of 
local merchants was not to be touched, despite directives from the 
20 
Central Committee. 
As the strength and prestige of the Central Base grew, the 
strength and prestige of the Communist headquarters in Shanghai dimin­
ished. Criticisms were fired at Mao from Shanghai, to which he soon 
responded, at the Party-Army Conference in Kutien in 1929. He presented 
21 
a resolution, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," which was 
passed despite strong opposition from several other leaders. In it he 
criticized the tendency toward a "purely military viewpoint" and re­
minded the Party members that the military tasks of the Red Army were 
secondary to its "political" tasks—that is, the education and organiza­
tion of the peasants, the rebels, the prisoners, and the soldiers them­
selves. This stress on education derived from Mao's belief that unless 
the old notions of hierarchy could be given up, a military victory would 
result in a repetition of all the past rebellions in China: a mere 
change of regime, with the huge majority of the people no better off 
than before. At the Kutien Conference Mao also reiterated his belief 
in land reform as central to Party and Army policy, land reform based 
22 
on a detailed investigation of the social situation in each area. 
By mid-1929 a new and more prosperous Central Base area was 
established by the Army. The basic organization of the area was the 
39 
same as before: peasants' organizations, local militia and Red Guards 
for local defense, the Red Army for broader defense, all working in 
cooperation. 
The period at the Central Base in southeastern China is gener­
ally divided into three parts. Between February 1929 and November 1930 
the Central Base was established, responsible to the Shanghai Communist 
P J 
headquarters. The Communists used as flexibly as possible all the 
previously established policies of organization: democratic centralism, 
propaganda and agitation, study of Party documents, and criticism and 
personal confession. Between November 1930 and November 1931, the Base 
was greatly expanded to cover nineteen thousand square miles including 
three million people. With peasant support the Communists set up a 
system of soviets and declared the southeast of China to be the Chinese 
25 
Soviet Republic. A congress was held to elect a Central Executive 
Committee, and Mao was elected chairman. He was by no means in full 
control, however, for two vice-chairmen were elected who sided with the 
policies of the Central Committee in Shanghai, most of whose ideas con-
tinued to differ radically from Mao's. The Politburo, the action 
organ of the Central Committee, called for greater internal discipline. 
They opposed guerrilla warfare, which they considered unsophisticated, 
27 
and promoted modern positional warfare. The third period of the south­
eastern Central Base began in 1932, when Politburo supporters within the 
Base were able to take control of the Base government. They immediately 
28 
cancelled Mao's many military and political reforms. A rigid hier­
archy was introduced into the Army, and educational programs for cadres 
29 
were greatly reduced. Cadres who did not support the government uncon­
ditionally were punished or killed. The policy of equal distribution of 
1+0 
land to all non-landlords was deemed incorrect. All landlords, rich 
30 
peasants, and rich merchants were to be killed or expropriated. The 
end result of these new policies was total disaster. The Central Base 
31 
and all surrounding bases were lost to KM1 troops by late 193U» and 
32 
millions were killed. 
The Long March 
In October 193U, a poorly-organized retreat from the Base was 
begun. No one but certain top officials knew what was happening. Over 
two hundred thousand people began the six-thousand-mile journey that 
came to be called the Long March. About half of these were peasants too 
33 
frightened to stay behind. It is estimated that less than thirty 
thousand people completed the journey. Brutal weather, difficult ter-
q I 
rain, and near-daily battles caused thousands of deaths. 
During the Long March, Mao was returned to leadership of the Red 
Army by a majority decision at the historic Tsunyi Conference. It is 
believed eighteen leaders attended, including Politburo members and 
certain members of the Army and the Central Committee. Mao did not at 
that time attempt a criticism of the political attitudes and behavior 
of the Party leadership of the previous three years. This was to occur 
later, when a secure base was established. Because of the desperation 
of the situation he criticized only the incompetence of the military 
leadership. He condemned the policy of calling for military action 
without providing the cadres and officers with a thorough explanation of 
why such decisions had been made. He condemned the whole style of battle 
35 
that had cost so many lives and the loss of so much territory. 
The Long March ended in late 1935 in the desolate and isolated 
northern areas of Shensi province, where a new base was established. 
ia 
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Mao set about immediately rebuilding the Party and the Army. His 
concern for education deepened, for few of the people who survived that 
expedition were literate. Teachers were desperately needed. Mao began 
writing basic texts, translating the Marxist-Leninist concept of dialec­
tical materialism into a language that could be more easily understood 
by the Chinese peasants. He tried to illustrate the theory with examples 
from Chinese literature and history. 
The base was expanded over the next year, and in 193& the central 
39 
government was transferred to the Yenan area of the base. It was in 
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CHAPTER IY 
THOUGHT REFORM AT YENAN—1936-1949 
In 1936 the Politburo directed Mao to set up Kangta, the "Resist 
Japan University." There, and in branch centers, one hundred thousand 
cadres were trained over the next seven years."'" These training centers 
were modeled after Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, which had been 
devised earlier by the Russian Communists for training Chinese intel­
lectuals. 
The extreme isolation of these training centers required impro­
visation when difficulties arose. They had few books or advisors to 
assist them. It is possible that the introspective aspects that became 
characteristic of thought reform procedures were a result of this early 
isolation, for the people and their often Confucian ideas were all that 
were available for resources. Russian advisers, in fact, were sometimes 
2 
critical of what appeared to be excessive reference to Confucian ethics. 
Recruits to Kangta were drawn by posters and by word-of-mouth 
from throughout China. Many intellectuals made their way to the base, 
and many of them were accepted at Kangta. Veteran peasant cadres were 
3 
automatically accepted. Many graduates of Kangta became part of the 
government administration at Yenan. The tensions inherent in their 
diverse backgrounds were to grow over the next years.^ 
The colleges taught Marxism^Leninism, methods of working with 
£ 
people, and military strategy and tactics. It was at Kangta that Mao 
delivered his famous speeches, "On Practice" and "On Contradiction," 
KH 
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which contained his early ideas on the necessity of ongoing education 
6 *7 
programs within the Party. In "On Practice" Mao spoke of the need for 
revolutionaries to test and change ideas through practice: 
The struggle of the proletariat and revolutionary people to 
change the world comprises the fulfillment of the following 
tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, 
their own subjective world—to change their cognitive ability 
and change the relations between the subjective and objective 
world. 
He voiced his commitment to the concept of self-transformation: "The 
epoch of world Communism will be reached when all mankind voluntarily 
Q 
and consciously changes itself and the world." In "On Contradiction" 
Mao attacked what he considered to be inflexible interpretations of 
Marxi sm-Lenini sm. 
In 1936 the Party decided to ease up on land reforms in the base 
areas and devote efforts to the formation of a second anti-Japanese 
9 
United Front. Although Chiang Kai-shek resisted the idea, popular 
opinion forced his participation in 1937> when Japan invaded China in 
f o r c e . I n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  s l o w - u p  o n  l a n d  r e f o r m ,  t h e  C C P  w o n  b r o a d  
peasant support through the moderate reforms it did effect, such as tax 
reforms and rent reductions. The success of CCP policies could be seen 
in the growth of Party membership and the rapid expansion of Communist-
controlled territory."*""'" In 1935 there had been forty thousand members; 
by 1938 there were two hundred thousand; and by late 194-1 there were 
12 
eight hundred thousand members. 
From Yenan the Comm-unists called for a second United Front with 
the KMT, its goal to be the expulsion of Japanese invaders and the uni­
fication of the Chinese people around anti-imperialism. Chiang, under 
pressure from his subordinates, acquiesced. The alliance against Japan 
46 
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began in 1937. The Communists agreed to allow the Nationalists to 
command their army, but they retained de facto control. 
Through the anti-Japanese struggles the Communists were able to 
win Chinese areas back from Japan and continue their programs of educa­
tion and land reform. As the Communists gained power and popularity, 
the Nationalists weakened, from internal corruption and from Japanese 
takeover of Nationalist-controlled areas. The Nationalists responded 
to the pressure by becoming increasingly tyrannical and oppressive."^ 
The ways in which the CCP and the Army won the support of peas­
ants wherever they went always involved political education. One 
example of this involved the Japanese armies. As Japanese armies 
approached a village, their officials would send word ahead to levy 
taxes and have grain and women waiting for the soldiers. The peasants, 
having endured identical plunder under the KMT armies, would often be 
resigned and apathetic. The Communists countered this by setting up a 
heated debate among a few people on how to levy taxes for the Japanese. 
Some would suggest that the rich should pay more than the poor, rather 
than a flat rate for everyone. The peasants, having a glimmer of a 
more fair apportionment of the taxes, often took the cadres' advice and 
fled from the villages with their possessions. Landlords had to follow, 
lest they be taxed for the rest. Many peasants were politicized in 
this way. 
The Red Army had more long-term methods of educating as well. 
To reassure people that it had the numerical strength to support rebel­
lion, a unit of the Army would pass through a village. One or two cadres 
would then return to the village to hold a meeting. At the meeting they 
would announce that they, as Communist Party members, supported women's 
kl 
rights and divorce. They asked that women with grievances meet secretly 
with them. From this small beginning, a women's organization would 
1E> 
grow. Within such organizations, the development of political aware­
ness would continue. The cadres would encourage the women to "speak 
bitterness," to share their personal experiences of pain and rage and 
grief. As the women listened to each other and listened to the Com­
munist explanation of their situation, they became aware that their 
grievances were as much a political as a personal matter."^ 
The Red Theater was another powerful method the Army used to 
win people's trust. Organized as early as 1931 > i"t was composed of num­
erous theatrical troupes. The troupes traveled throughout the Red areas, 
arousing anti-Japanese nationalism and providing much-appreciated divert 
17 
sion for the peasants. 
Other methods were used in areas controlled by the Japanese. In 
these areas there were always many peasants who were ready and willing 
to join any movement to expel the Japanese. To support these individuals, 
small detachments of troops would leave the Yenan base and filter through 
Japanese lines. Behind the lines they would organize and train the 
peasants into a resistance force. Militia were established in each 
village. The peasants involved were trained by night, to avoid observ­
ance by the Japanese. 
The military detachments who entered these villages would be 
accompanied by teams of civilians, who were specifically responsible for 
political organizing. They organized Peasants* Associations, Women's 
Associations, village councils, and consumer cooperatives. The most 
committed and active peasants were invited to form or join local Com­
munist Party organizations. A huge underground network was thus built 
48 
up inside enemy lines. 
Inside the Red base areas, political study was part of daily 
routine. In the schools, in the military units, and in all organizations 
19 
time was set aside to read or discuss the writings Mao had prepared. 
In 1939 Mao initiated a more intense, year-long, study program 
for four thousand students. Basic Communist texts were studied, as were 
the writings of Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i, the CCP leader who would become 
the major target of the Cultural Revolution twenty-five years later. 
Basic reading, writing, and arithmetic were also taught. 
During the next three years, Mao continued to write and speak on 
the importance of ongoing education and intra-Party criticism and debate. 
He continued to stress his conviction that education, rather than pun-
20 
ishment, was the solution to intra-Party conflicts. 
By 194-0 the rapid expansion of CCP-controlled territory so 
threatened the KMT leadership that they unofficially ended United Front 
programs of cooperation with the Communists and blockaded the Yenan 
border region. At about the same time, the Japanese attacked the Com­
munist areas with even greater force. Mao's concern with political 
education within the base areas did not diminish, however, in spite of 
21 
these increasing military and economic pressures. 
The Cheng-feng Campaign of 1942-1944 
Thought reform as a movement solidified in the Yenan area be­
tween 1942-1944* A rectification and training program, called the 
22 23 
Cheng-ferg ("spirit reform"), or Party Consolidation Movement, was 
launched by Mao to debate issues causing tension between the two diver­
gent lines of thought that had continued within the Party leadership.^ 
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One line was led by Mao, who viewed the peasants as the main 
revolutionary force and called for broad political participation by the 
peasantry. The other was led by Wang Ming, who viewed the urban indus­
trial workers as the main revolutionary force and wanted a tightly-
controlled, hierarchical Party organization that could direct peasant 
participation from above. 
Supporters of the Wang Ming line were largely intellectuals, 
students, local landlords, and former officials. Although these groups 
had very diverse reasons for supporting Wang Ming, all were members of 
the educated classes who were familiar with and supportive of bureau­
cratic reform policies. Supporters of the Mao Tse-tung line were mostly 
peasant cadres, largely illiterate, who had been active in military 
struggles and whose chief loyalty was to their home communities. Both 
groups shared a commitment to a free China and to the expulsion of the 
Japanese invaders, but beyond that they had little in common. Few of 
25 
either group had much knowledge of Communist theory. 
The Communist leadership as a whole recognized that somehow they 
had to make disciplined workers of the sympathetic, but inexperienced, 
26 
intellectuals. The leadership also recognized the need to teach the 
peasants a broader political perspective. The leadership hoped to trans­
fer the primary loyalty of both groups to the Communist Party, but the 
27 
two lines had different ideas about how to achieve this. 
The Cheng-feng had been a goal of Mao's since the Long March. 
He had long believed that both the Party organization and individuals 
within the organization needed to clarify some goals, ideas, and behav-
28 
ior. The Cheng-feng expanded on these earlier ideas. It began in 
February 194-2, when Mao delivered two speeches attacking abstract 
50 
studies of Marxism-Leninism that were not grounded in the Chinese exper­
ience: "It seems that right up to the present time quite a few have 
regarded Marxism-Leninism as a ready-made panacea: once you have it, you 
can cure all your ills with little effort. This is a type of blindness 
29 
and we must start a movement to enlighten these people." 
Mao was extremely upset with intellectuals in the Party who set 
themselves up as teachers and taught a dogmatic Marxism which most of 
the peasants could not understand. Many elitist attitudes had been 
carried into the Party with the influx of intellectuals into Yenan, 
and Mao was critical of the authoritarian behavior and the expanded 
30 
bureaucracy that had resulted. These attitudes had both angered and 
intimidated many of the uneducated peasant cadres, who had loyally 
31 
worked and fought to build the Yenan base. Mao hoped that a recti­
fication program would provide a way to vent hostilities, open up com­
munication throughout the Party, and force a restructuring of the Party 
bureaucracy. 
The motto of the Cheng-feng was "unity-criticism-unity." It 
was not intended to be a purge. Criticism and self-criticism were to 
replace expulsion, physical punishment, and death as methods of bringing 
32 
about change. The underlying assumption in criticism and self-criti­
cism was that people needed support to change the victim and/or oppressor 
attitudes they inherited from the "old" China. Criticism and self-
criticism were intended to pressure people to become aware of their old 
"bourgeois," individualist attitudes and behavior (greed, selfishness, 
laziness, hypocrisy, malice, etc.) and develop a "proletarian," class 
attitude (cooperation, commitment, responsibility, willingness to work 
hard, cleanliness, etc.). Each person would share information and 
51 
feelings about his or her life and ask for a response from the others, 
33 
who were to offer constructive criticism. 
Mao laid down two basic guidelines for the Cheng-feng: 
. . . two principles must be observed. The first is, "punish 
the past to warn the future," and the second, "save men by-
curing their ills." Past errors must be exposed with no 
thought of personal feelings or face. We must use a scienr-
tific attitude to analyze and criticize what has been unde­
sirable in the past . . . this is the meaning of "punish the 
past to warn the future." But our object in exposing errors 
and criticizing shortcomings is like that of a doctor in 
curing a disease. The entire purpose is to save the person, 
not to cure him to death. If a man has appendicitis, a 
doctor performs an operation and the man is saved ... we 
cannot adopt a brash attitude toward diseases in thought 
and politics, but [must have] an attitude of "saving men by 
curing their diseases."34 
Mao's concept of "curing the patient" through reeducation in­
cluded more than information-sharing and historical analysis. It also 
included application of various psychological techniques. He believed 
that old attitudes were deeply ingrained, and that psychological pres-
35 
sure must be brought to bear before a person could give them up: 
It is necessary to destroy these conditions and sweep them 
away, but it is not easy. The task must be performed properly, 
which means that a reasonable explanation must be given. If 
the explanation is very reasonable, if it is to the point, it 
can be effective. The first step in reasoning is to give the 
patient a powerful stimulus: yell at him, "You're sick!" so 
the patient will have a fright and break out in an overall sweat; 
then he can actually be started on the road to recovery.3° 
This notion of shocking individuals out of mental lethargy and forcing 
them to confront internal inconsistencies became a routine aspect of 
thought reform. 
During the Cheng-feng all cadres engaged in intense study of 
37 
Party documents, reading, writing, and discussing. They examined 
their past in terms of class, behavior, and attitude, and they engaged 
in criticism and self-criticism. The small groups in which they 
52 
regularly met became much like modern encounter groups. At its most 
intense level, the meeting would become a "struggle," in which the 
person being criticized would be vehemently insulted by the rest of the 
group in an attempt to force a change of old values and the adoption of 
39 
group values. 
The justification for this psychological pressure was both 
ideological and pragmatic. It was ideological in that the Communists 
believed their perspective to be correct, i.e., they believed it con­
formed to actual conditions in the world. They believed that the "old 
society" was corrupt and evil, and that everyone who was a part of that 
society was partially corrupted, having internalized its values to some 
extent. The psychological pressure was intended to assist people in 
"thought reform," in finding a new, more "correct" perspective.^ The 
justification for the psychological pressure was pragmatic in that the 
only way the revolutionary movement could continue to function success­
fully under the intense wartime conditions was through increased com­
munications and shared values, goals, and actions.^" While the Party 
leadership recognized that flexibility was a necessity under guerrilla 
conditions, they hoped to achieve as much control as possible by being 
sure that as many supporters as possible shared their political theory. 
The goal of the Cheng-feng, therefore, was to teach the cadres Marxist-
Leninist theory insofar as it could be creatively applied to the Chinese 
situation.^ 
Of the eighteen documents selected for study during the Cheng-
feng, at least seven were written by Mao, and only two had non-Chinese 
authors. In making the selection Mao was once again establishing the 
independence of the Chinese Communist struggle in the area of political 
theorv. ̂  
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The Cheng1-feng was to have lasted three months. All cadres 
throughout the region participated in study groups for two hours a day. 
The three-month program was found to be insufficient, however, and it 
was repeatedly extended. The Cheng-feng lasted for up to two years in 
some parts of the base.^ 
Tension between cultural workers and the Communists was as 
present at Yenan as it was to be in the future. In 194-2 the Party held 
a Forum of Writers and Artists. The cultural workers were asked to live 
and work among the people, to change their ways of thinking, and to draw 
their energy and inspiration from the peasants. They were asked to 
alter their styles to make their work comprehensible to the peasants. 
Many resisted, but many were able to do so. The stories and plays that 
resulted had a powerful effect on the Yenan population. Artistic ex­
pression was also encouraged among the peasants, and woodcuts, prints, 
and paper cutouts reflected their creativity. 
The Party leadership, including 267 cadres from various organ­
izations, participated in the three-month Conference of Senior Cadres in 
1942. Using criticism/self-criticism, study, and organizational analy­
sis, they succeeded in establishing a new unity. They also developed the 
principles of "mass line" politics, a two-way process designed to raise 
the political consciousness of the peasants and to overcome elitist lead­
ership practices within the Party organization.^ Mao described it as: 
. . . summing up (i.e., coordinating and systematizing after 
careful study) the views of the masses (i.e., views scattered 
and unsystematic), then taking the resulting ideas back to the 
masses, explaining and popularizing them until the masses emr-
brace them as their own, stand up for them, and translate them 
into action by way of testing their correctness. Then it is 
necessary once more to sum up the views of the masses and once 
again take the resulting ideas back to the masses so that the 
masses give them their wholehearted support . . . and so on, 
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over and over again, so that each time these ideas emerge 
with greater correctness and become more vital and meaning­
ful.1" 
The purpose was to ground the leadership in the realities of the peas­
ants' lives, to learn from the peasants, and to slowly educate the 
J ft 
peasants to the broader political implications of their situation. 
The Cheng-feng was the first large rectification campaign within 
Kg 
the Communist Party. It set a precedent for solving the intra-Party 
50 
disputes that were to occur as the Party expanded. Its success as a 
method of political education established rectification campaigns as a 
5l 
major instrument of thought reform. At least ten such campaigns were 
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initiated within the Party over the next twenty-five years. 
The Cheng-feng was only one part of a broader revolutionary 
program at Yenan. Six other campaigns were initiated during the same 
period. These involved a transfer of government power to local com­
munities and a concommitant reduction of the higher-level bureaucracy; 
a "back to the village" campaign, which sent intellectuals to the coun­
tryside to work among the peasants; a campaign for reduction of rent 
and interest; a campaign to generate cooperatives throughout the rural 
53 
areas; a production campaign; and a mass literacy campaign. Through­
out this period, military victories continued. By the end of 1944 "the 
Communists controlled one million square miles, which included nineteen 
54 
base areas and one-fourth of China's population. 
Just before the end of World War II, Chiang offered the Commun­
ists representation in the Nationalist government in exchange for control 
of the Communist Army. Mao rejected the offer. He demanded a constitu­
tional convention in which the people could decide the form the govern­
ment would take. He also asked for weapons for the Communist Army for 
55 
its battles against the Japanese. 
Y/hen the Japanese were defeated at the end of the War, the 
United States gave the Nationalists extensive aid to defeat the Commun­
ists. The Communists lost several eastern and northern cities. They 
retreated into the provinces in northern China and in Manchuria. Civil 
war was renewed in the autumn of 1945. A brief truce was mediated by 
General George Marshall, but when Russia withdrew from Manchuria in 
1946, the truce ended in a battle for control of that province.^ 
The Rectification Campaign of 1947-1948 
One other rectification campaign took place before the CCP vic­
tory of 1949. It occurred in 1947-1948. The war with the Japanese had 
ended, but the civil war continued. Party membership had swollen to 
56 
2.7 million members. Many of these were KMT troops who had deserted 
the KMT army or were captured by the Communists. They had been given 
57 
the choice of returning to their villages or joining the Red Army, 
and hundreds of thousands joined up after being recruited at "speak 
58 
bitterness" meetings. Mao's concern with the new and undisciplined 
recruits was how to incorporate them into the army, known then as the 
People's Liberation Army (PLA).^ In addition, Mao wanted to correct 
the abuses that were being wrongly inflicted upon middle peasants by 
both Party and Army members.^ 
In an effort to politically educate the new soldiers, Mao once 
again formed soldiers' committees at company level. These committees 
were to elect representatives to work with officers in the areas of food 
distribution and budgeting. Seasoned battle veterans were assigned to 
instruct new recruits in the ways of study and criticism. All were 
56 
required, to examine their background, their attitudes, and their per­
formances. According to William Hinton, "Officers . . . taught soldiers, 
soldiers . . . taught officers, and soldiers . . . taught one another. 
The campaign . . . resulted in unprecedented unity throughout the Army, 
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a high level of political consciousness, and surging morale." Dis­
cussion on all levels was to take place before any military decision 
was put into effect. Apparently the changes were effective, for 
Hinton, who was in China at that time, commented on what he considered 
the unique qualities of the soldiers in the PLA: 
The soldiers were carefree yet dignified, fun-loving but not 
raucous, friendly but not condescending. These attitudes 
reflected something inside them, a confident and purposeful 
spirit. All this could never be imposed by restraint but 
was the result of revolutionary commitment strengthened by 
education.64 
To rectify abuses by Party members, Mao asked the assistance of 
the peasants' associations. He asked them to criticize and weed out 
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cadres who were behaving tyrannically or practicing terrorism. In 
Panshen, Hinton describes how this campaign occurred in the village of 
Long Bow, where Party rectification took place within the broader con­
text of land reform and thought reform among the peasants. Because it 
magnifies the ways in which rural change occurred, it is worth a closer 
look. 
Hinton believes the word fanshen ("to turn over") captured the 
spirit of the CCP programs: 
To China's hundreds of millions of landless and land-poor 
peasants it meant to stand up, to throw off the landlord yoke, 
to gain land, stock, implements, and houses. But it meant 
much more than this. It meant to throw off superstition and 
study science, to abolish "word blindness" and learn to read, 
to cease considering women as chattels and establish equality 
between the sexes, to do away with appointed village magis­
trates and replace them with elected councils. It meant to 
enter a new world.66 
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This change of attitude was considered by the Chinese Communists to be 
a task of highest priority, and central to that task was the concept of 
thought reform. Thought reform was never viewed as an isolated process, 
but was integral to a larger process of reform, to an ongoing and total 
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transformation of the peasants' ways of life. 
In Long Bow, as in many other areas, a Communist underground 
had been in operation long before the Japanese were finally expelled in 
1945- These peasant cadres did not identify themselves as party members 
until the Rectification Campaign of 1948 > for until that time there was 
the possibility of Japanese return, in which case those who had domin­
ated the area might return and take vengeance on the cadres and their 
families.^ 
The cadres did take active leadership immediately after the 
Japanese departure, however, and along with other peasant leaders (also 
called cadres) they formed a "People's Government," called a village 
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meeting, and set about taking charge of needed reforms. 
One of their first tasks was to call the landlords before the 
people, who were expected to voice their pent-up grievances. The reac­
tion of the peasants, however, was only a stunned silence. Confused, 
the cadres met with several small groups of people that night to learn 
why, after years of abuse, the peasants were unwilling to speak up. The 
answer, of course, was fear. They feared the Japanese might return, and 
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they had heard that the army of the Communists was not as well-equipped. 
The cadres talked with people in the small groups, encouraging 
them to tell their stories of the abuses they had suffered at the hands 
of the Japanese and the collaborators. As some people began to speak, 
others joined in. Many finally agreed to participate in the large 
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meeting the next day. They did so, accusing the landlords of past of­
fenses. As the peasants spoke, the cadres attempted to provide a 
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political analysis of the situation. 
The cadres got some aid and support from the Party hierarchy— 
from the district, to the county, to the border region committees, to 
the Central Committee headed by Mao. The main responsibility for the 
transformation of the villages, however, was left to the local cadres. 
Hinton1s description of this effort in Long Bow makes clear that it was 
never a simple matter of ordering the peasants to change, as is some­
times believed. As mentioned earlier, Party cadres were not even iden­
tified as such until 1948. Party leadership in the villages was not 
direct, but stemmed from the active participation of some of its local 
members in the village militia, the Peasants' Association, and/or the 
Women's Association. Most tried hard to set a good example. They 
consulted each other and stuck together after they had studied an issue 
and come to a final decision. Even though some did eventually try to 
take advantage of leadership positions and order people around, for the 
most part they could only effect changes through example, education, and 
72 persuasion. 
Superstition was very much a part of peasant life, and the Com­
munists worked hard to persuade people to rely on each other for sus­
tenance, and not on spirits, astrology, or mud idols. The cadres, having 
been raised with the same superstitions as their neighbors, found that 
they first had to loosen their own ties to the old beliefs, which they 
attempted mainly through discussion. An event in a neighboring village 
had a profound effect on the whole area. Hinton describes it: 
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[in the village of Sand Bank] there stood a shrine to the god 
Ch'i-t'ien, a very powerful Buddhist deity who, when displeased, 
could curse one and all with dysentery. Since people only too 
often died of this disease, Ch'i-t'ien was greatly to be feared. 
Many a stick of incense was burned before his image and many an 
offering of food was left for his spirit to eat. The Party mem­
bers of Sand Bank decided to attack Ch'i-t'ien just like any 
landlord. They figured out how much money they had spent humor­
ing him over the years and discovered it was enough to have saved 
many lives in a famine year. When they took these calculations 
to their Peasants' Association, many young men and women got very 
angry. They went to the temple, pulled the god out of his shel­
ter and carried him to the village office. Before a mass meeting 
they settled accounts with him by proving that he had squandered 
their wealth without giving any protection in return. Then they 
smashed his mud image with sticks and stones. Some of the older 
people tried to stop them. They prophesied that everyone in­
volved would die of dysentery in a few days. But the young men 
and women went right ahead. When no one fell ill that night nor 
the whole of the next day, the hold of Ch'i-t'ien on the village 
collapsed.73 
This so impressed the people of Long Bow that they went through the same 
process with one of their own gods. 
Another factor that undercut superstition in China was the over­
throw of the gentry class. The peasants believed that certain uncon­
trollable conditions at birth, as well as the positions of one's ances­
tors' graves, determined one's fate. They therefore believed that the 
gentry were wealthy because of mysterious and unpredictable spiritual 
occurrences. They believed that their own lives of suffering were also 
predetermined. The fact that the gentry had been overthrown served to 
greatly undercut these beliefs. Gradually their loyalty was transferred 
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to their own Peasants' Association, and the Army and Party. 
Public meetings were the village cadres' main method of communi­
cating with the people, and attendance at meetings was generally required. 
The CCP believed that only through ongoing political participation by 
the people could reforms be effected. The peasants, however, sometimes 
felt that their time could better be spent farming, and adjustments were 
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sometimes made. A saying circulated throughout the Communist-controlled 
areas: "Under the Nationalists too many taxes; under the Communists 
too many meetings." 
Peasants who for some reason felt a strong alliance to the gentry 
were sometimes sent to district-level classes by the village government. 
In these classes they would study the workings of the old semi-feudal 
system and begin to understand their position within that system. Each 
would tell his or her own story. Others would listen and sympathize, 
criticize, or ridicule in an attempt to motivate the person to change 
his or her behavior in the future. 
Any affection for gentry individuals on the part of Party mem­
bers or non-Party cadres was even more strongly attacked. Class lines 
were strictly drawn, and could be crossed only by gentry willing to 
give up their privileges. 
Hinton describes how over time some of the cadres began to abuse 
their positions in the village. Their abuses varied, ranging from 
authoritarian attitudes to neglect of duty to petty theft to rape and 
other violence. Some became quite tyrannical. This greatly alienated 
the peasants. To counter the abuses of leadership the government and 
Party organized a "Wash Your Pace" Campaign in spring 1947• To achieve 
this government cleanup, all village cadres were told they must "pass 
the gate." The "gate" was a council of delegates who were to be elected 
by the villagers. Each village activist was to appear in public before 
the council and submit to criticism and self-criticism. 
In Long Bow, the first attempt at the gate was cancelled by the 
district when it became clear that the delegates to the gate were out 
for revenge rather than rehabilitation. The district leaders became 
frightened and unsure of how to deal with the peasants' anger. The 
villagers took this behavior to mean that the leadership was more inter­
ested in protecting local cadres than in helping the peasants, and were 
even more angered. Some of the cadres who had been behaving tyrannically 
also misinterpreted the cancellation of the gate and began behaving even 
more tyrannically than ever. It was obvious something needed to be done. 
The Communist Party's Draft Agrarian Law of 1947 radically af­
fected the political involvement of peasants throughout China. The law 
called upon the Peasants' Associations to take over the land and all 
property and possessions of the landlords and rich peasants. The land 
was to be divided among all the people, including the landlords, in a 
way that would leave everyone, regardless of sex, with roughly equal 
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amounts of land and property. Anna Louise Strong has described land 
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reform as the first major step for women's liberation in China. Hinton 
agreed: 
On many other questions the women were divided. While the 
younger women were very concerned about free choice in marriage, 
older women saw this as a threat to their control over their 
daughters-in-law. While younger women opposed all family beat­
ings, older women tended to countenance beatings just so long 
as mothers-in-law administered them. On one issue they all were 
agreed, however. Women should be able to get and keep a share 
in the land.^O 
Although the oppression of women in China by no means ended with 
the CCP victories, the women found they had a powerful ally when they 
did speak up. Many women became politically active, and many joined the 
8l 
Party. The Women's Associations that were formed in the villages 
served as a place where women could share their stories. As they became 
articulate they organized literacy classes and political study groups 
and were active in the overall production and defense efforts in the 
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villages. When the women were beaten by husbands, fathers- or mothers-
in-law for attending meetings, they developed ways to change such be­
havior. Hinton describes how after one such beating the women of the 
village called a meeting and had the offending husband explain his 
actions. He said he had beaten his wife because "the only reason women 
On 
go to meetings is to gain a free hand for flirtation and seduction." 
The women vehemently protested his attitude. They finally became so 
enraged at his stubbornly arrogant behavior that they physically as­
saulted him and nearly beat him unconscious. Although this was not the 
method of reeducation promoted by the Communists, the men did learn to 
become more cautious about wife-beating, which was a common practice. 
The women found that thereafter they could usually reason with the men. 
They would remind a man that his wife could now divorce him, and that 
O 1 
now he must treat her with respect if he wanted her to stay. 
Along with the Draft Law, the Party initiated the Rectification 
Campaign of 19U8. Work teams were sent into certain villages in the 
spring of the year to explain the new law and to investigate the local 
Party organizations. The work teams included ten to twelve cadres drawn 
equally from university and peasant volunteers. All participants had 
been through extensive preparation for their task. Hinton describes the 
preparation of the university members, of whom he was one. Each intel­
lectual who volunteered had had to write an autobiography stressing his 
or her class background. Small groups of fifteen to twenty people met 
daily to study Communist theory concerning class society. Those of 
gentry backgrounds had had to state a willingness to give up their loy­
alty to their past lives and to their families, and to express primary 
loyalty to the workers and peasants. This had proven very painful and 
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emotion-filled, for each knew that she might find herself in the position 
of having to watch her own family being tried and expropriated by the 
peasants. Although the Draft Law opposed physical violence, such viol­
ence did occur and could be expected to continue. Many of these people 
suffered loss of sleep and loss of appetite, and wept as they struggled 
to make the decision. Hinton observed that for the most'part, the 
intellectuals who went through the thought reform process seemed to 
appreciate it: "The spartan life, the intellectual ferment, the group 
companionship, and the physical and mental well-being that developed as 
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a result of remolding their ideology moved most of them deeply." 
The work teams set about to reform the Party organizations 
throughout the occupied areas. Their attitude was to be "kill the dis­
ease and save the patient." In Long Bow, all Communist meetings were 
declared open to the public. This required for the first time that the 
Communists identify themselves as such. The political environment was 
such at that time that the Central Committee had decided it was safe to 
admit Party membership. 
Public meetings, meetings of organizations, and small group 
meetings were held as the peasants prepared to participate. Four ques­
tions were discussed: "What is the Communist Party?" "Is the Communist 
Party good or bad?" "If it is good, how can it contain its bad members?" 
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"What should be done for the bad members?" 
The last question especially provoked much discussion. Many 
still felt the bad cadres should be beaten. Others took a more moderate 
stance. The work teams, who were to oversee the gate, had been instructed 
to be sure that the cadres were not physically nor emotionally destroyed, 
but they were also to make sure that the abuses of the cadres were 
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addressed. In addition, they were to make the situation safe enough 
for the peasants to speak up without fear that any errant cadres might 
retaliate. 
Two successive gates were held to ensure the cadres a fair heart­
ing. The first gate was quite successful. People attended eagerly as 
soon as they realized they would genuinely be heard. Because it was in 
the winter season, the meetings went on all day every day until all 
twenty-six Party cadres had been reviewed. All but four passed the 
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gate. These four appeared before the second gate, which was held 
later, along with non-Party cadres who had not yet faced the gate. All 
four Party members were passed when the villagers became convinced that 
they were genuinely sorry for their past behavior and committed to 
reform. Three extremely oppressive non-Party cadres did not pass, and 
they were to appear before the People's Congress as soon as that new 
legal body was formed. In the interim, two of them were sent to a 
special school that the Communists had established for persons who did 
not pass the gate in their home communities. The idea behind the school 
was to remove the cadres from their village environments and give them 
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supportive teachers, and space and time to study and think. 
Hinton observed that the rectification campaign taught the peas­
ants much confidence in their ability to articulate their grievances and 
reminded Party members of their accountability to the people. It had 
also offered a workable alternative to the traditional physical punish­
ment of wrongdoers. 
In 1948, in preparation for victory, the Communists initiated 
the political processes preparatory to the creation of People's Con­
gresses. The new government was to be based on the election of local 
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People's Councils, which were to govern the villages and to elect dele­
gates to the Regional Congresses. The Regional Congresses were then to 
join with the congresses elected in the cities to elect delegates to the 
89 
National Congress. 
Before permitting the village-level elections to take place, 
however, work teams were to undertake more political education. For 
several days before the elections were to occur, the people met in groups 
to discuss the purpose of the Congress, the duties of the elected offi­
cers, and the responsibilities of people in a democracy. It was explained 
that the Communist Party members could be elected to the Congress, but 
that they would have no more authority than any other delegate. The 
Party members, like anyone else, were to influence public opinion only 
through persuasion, education, and participation. 
The question of popular participation in government was also 
discussed. Some believed democracy to mean freedom to attend or not to 
attend meetings. Others felt attendance must be required. Others agreed 
that attendance was necessary for full democratic participation, but felt 
this was so only if people could voluntarily choose to participate. A 
general consensus was reached in Long Bow that there were common responsi­
bilities, and among these was attendance at and participation in meetings. 
People who chose not to attend nor participate would be subject to public 
criticism. 
When the elections took place, sixteen women and nineteen men 
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were elected to the People's Council in Long Bow. 
Hinton was fascinated by the processes of thought reform and 
political education he observed while in China. He comments on the 
gradual but steady changes that occurred through the Communists' 
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willingness to do grass roots work: 
. . . each successive mobilization had the power to advance the 
understanding of all. The backward soon reached the level of 
their teachers, and so understanding spiralled until the whole 
concept of what was backward had to be revised. When such a 
process was consciously and systematically unfolded year after 
year, decade after decade, in a countryside containing millions 
of people, the total effect was astonishing. The whole people 
became politicized, became conscious, became active, and finally 
did indeed become capable of transforming themselves.91 
CCP Victory—19U9 
Between 1946 and 1949 the United States pumped almost two billion 
dollars into the Nationalist regime, but the Nationalists had lost popu­
lar support. They were unable to renew themselves. The Communists con­
tinued to capture Japanese weapons. They managed to take many U.S. 
weapons and supplies that had been given to the Nationalists. With 
peasant support, the Communists took control of the capitol at Nanking 
in the fall of 1949? at which time the Nationalists withdrew to the 
island of Taiwan. The Communists proclaimed the People's Republic of 
92 
China and proceeded to establish a unified central government in China. 
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CHAPTER V 
THOUGHT REFORM AS A NATIONAL PROGRAM, 1949-1959 
The Chinese Communists faced an enormous task when they took 
power in 1949. The years of internal and external warfare and recent 
national disasters—floods, famine, and drought—had left the economy 
and the transportation systems in chaos. The people were worn out and 
1 2 
hungry. Malnutrition and disease were rampant. Assisted by the 
Soviet government, the new government went to work immediately to re-
3 
store order and unity. 
The government established by the Communists was modeled after 
that of Russia: government and Party separate, but with Party members 
actively involved in government at all levels.^ The new government 
declared itself to be a "people's democratic dictatorship." It was to 
be a coalition of Communists and non-Communists, with less stress on 
ideology and more on stabilizing the national economy. What exactly 
that meant and how long it was supposed to last before the next stage— 
socialism—was a source of friction within the Party leadership from 
the very start. 
Two opposing lines within the Party leadership once again emerged, 
with Mao increasingly at odds with the other Party leaders. Among other 
things, they disagreed on the priority that should be given to political 
education. Mao believed economic progress for China had to be subor­
dinated to the political education or "thought reform" of the Chinese 
people. He believed that unless people experienced a genuine change of 
71 
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values and priorities first, then the new economy would reflect the 
greed and competition of the old system. His opponents, ultimately 
identified with Liu Shao-chi, believed that "thought reform" had to be 
c; 
subordinated to, and would be facilitated by, economic progress. 
However they ranked political education on their scale of prio3>-
ities, both groups agreed that it was very important. The media, large 
posters (also known as "wall newspapers"), meetings, rallies, demonstra^-
tions, and various mobilization campaigns were used by the CCP to genera-
ate debate and discussion and to develop class consciousness throughout 
the Chinese population. 
A national program of "study groups" was formally begun with one 
national campaign. All Chinese but the very young were required to 
participate in one or more of these small groups, which were composed 
of ten to twenty people who shared a common neighborhood, workplace, or 
social activity. Study group participation took up to ten hours a week 
•f ^ for everyone. 
In the small groups, one person would read aloud Marxist and 
other Party documents, and then the entire group would apply those 
ideas to local, national, and international problems. Each person was 
expected to apply the "people's standpoint" to the issues discussed, 
using criticism and self-criticism as a method of arriving at that 
perspective. The "people's standpoint" was in effect the Communist 
7 Party's standpoint, insofar as that could be understood given the conr-
flicting directions that frequently resulted from the somewhat divided 
leadership.8 
Study groups also spent time on "daily life" criticisms and 
self-criticisms, during which the participants examined their personal 
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thoughts, attitudes, and actions. Coercion was to have no place in 
study groups. Peer pressure, however, did prove a powerful factor. 
Marxist jargon became a regular feature of political discussion. Ac­
cording to Robert Lifton, if a person did not satisfactorily apply the 
"people's standpoint," he would be told to "examine himself" and look 
into the causes of these "reactionary tendencies ... to search out the 
harmful 'bourgeois' and 'imperialistic' influences from his past for 
evaluation and self-criticism."9 Study groups became (and remain) one 
of the most important ways in which all Chinese engaged in ongoing 
political discussion and debate. They served to communicate Communist 
norms and to correct deviancies from those norms. 
The Communist commitment to the liberation of women continued 
after 1949. The Marriage Law of 1950 ended traditional family rela­
tions in China. Sheila Rowbotham describes the legal implications of 
that law: 
It ended the superior position of the man over the woman, it 
ended forced marriage, it secured monogamy and equal legal 
rights. "Bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference 
with the remarriage of widows and the execution of money or 
gifts shall be prohibited." Husband and wife had the right 
of free choice of occupation and free participation in work 
and social activities, and equal rights in the possession and 
management of property. Divorce was to be granted when "hus­
band and wife both desire." Responsibility for formulating 
and enforcing these new laws which related to women was with 
the All-China Democratic Women's Federation. 
Attempts to educate people to these new ways often met much 
resistance. Some women were even murdered as a result. Because of 
such incidents, the organizing of women was delayed in some areas until 
further education had been accomplished, but it resumed again in 1953# 
Where women could safely organize, many woman and child health centers 
and children's hospitals were established, as were many local health 
Ik 
centers. Although under-represented, women were active at all levels of 
12 
the government and Party, and their influence was strongly felt. 
Almost immediately after the Communists took power, most brothels 
were closed down by the Chinese people. In 1951 the government declared 
prostitution illegal and closed down the remaining brothels. The prosti­
tutes were treated as victims of the old order, and it was made known 
that their pasts were not to be held against them. The new government 
saw to it that the women were treated for venereal disease, which over 
90 percent of them suffered. Those new to prostitution were sent home 
to find respectable jobs. Prostitutes who had been in the practice for 
a long time were asked to attend Rehabilitation Centers. There they 
studied government policy toward prostitutes and were offered the pros­
pect of becoming equal partners in the creation of the new society. 
The women shared their pain-filled stories at "speak bitterness" meet­
ings, and through such sharing developed a deeper understanding of their 
situation. Part of each day was spent learning and practicing a trade, 
for which they received regular pay. They were also taught to read and 
write. Families were allowed to visit them, and the women were allowed 
to leave when they wished. When they left they were either sent back 
to their villages or helped to find jobs in the city. When prostitution 
had been largely eliminated, the Rehabilitation Centers were closed down 
13 
or used for other purposes. 
In 1951 two mass campaigns were initiated to isolate opponents 
of the new government and to generate nationalistic feelings. These 
were the "Resist America, Aid Korea" Campaign and the "Suppress Counter­
revolutionaries" Campaign. Among the targets of the latter were many 
intellectuals. 
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In general, the intellectuals had been impressed with the Com­
munist victory over the corrupt KMT regime, and many had worked actively 
15 
as or with the Communists. The Communists desperately needed the 
services of the intellectuals after 19K9» The intellectuals posed a 
problem for the Party members, however, who identified the intellectuals 
as part of the exploiting classes simply by virtue of the fact that they 
had been able to afford schooling, a luxury denied the vast majority of 
the Chinese people. 
The "thought reform" of intellectuals, therefore, was of major 
concern to the Party. Franklin Houn lists some of the behavior patterns 
with which the Communists charged the intellectuals: 
1. political—distrust of the CCP, antagonism to the Soviet 
Union, subservience to the Kuomintang, worship of America, 
indifference to the people's revolutionary struggle, re­
formism, conservatism, and bureaucratism. 
2. social—opportunism, lack of sense of duty, purely technical 
viewpoint, employee's viewpoint, contempt for labor, and 
desire to exploit fellow human beings. 
3. academic—intellectual sectarianism, subjective dogmatism, 
formalism, liberalism, pragmatism, and pure professional 
interest. 
k.  personal—egotism, selfishness, arrogance, extravagance, 
and emotionalism.17 
The Communists wanted to either change the attitudes of the intellectuals 
or at least to neutralize them, so that such patterns would not be passed 
on to younger Chinese."*"8 
As early as 1950, the government sent many intellectuals to the 
country, where land reform programs continued to provide a context for 
19 
the political education of the peasants. In 1951 "the CCP initiated 
the year-long Thought Reform Campaign, which was directed mainly at the 
intellectuals. Thousands attended "revolutionary universities," 
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institutions which had been in operation since 1949• Most intellectuals 
who attended volunteered to go, one reason being that the universities 
were intended as training centers for government personnel, but also 
because it was considered a patriotic thing to do. The university pro­
grams lasted for up to a year, but usually less. The methods of thought 
reform used in these centers became commonly used in mass campaigns 
after 1951 > so they deserve a closer look. Lifton describes a six-
month program.2^ 
Upon arrival at the universities, the intellectuals were assigned 
to a small group of about ten people. Each small group elected one of 
its members as a leader. Each small group was assigned to one of four 
large sections, each with about one thousand students. 
Lifton divides the university procedures into three parts: a 
period of togetherness and unity, a period of conflict and struggle, and 
a period of final thought summary and new harmony. 
The first two weeks of the university were completely informal. 
A sense of closeness and freedom and play predominated. At the end of 
two weeks, meetings were held to explain the program. The general mes­
sage was that old unhealthy values had to be reformed into new healthy 
values, to enable the intellectuals to better serve the people. Several 
formal courses were then taught, ranging from basic Marxism to field 
study, which included visits to places like factories. Each course had 
only one very long lecture. 
After each course lecture, students would gather in their small 
groups for discussion. All of each day was taken up with these study 
groups, until it was time for the next course lecture. If something 
important happened nationally, such as a speech by Mao, large gatherings 
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would be called to share it, and then the study groups would discuss the 
issues involved. 
All of the small group leaders would meet with a cadre once or 
twice a day to report how each person in their groups was doing. In 
this early period the small group leaders were told to allow open dis­
cussion and to serve mainly as group coordinators, not taking stands on 
issues. 
Over the next few weeks, the tone of the program gradually 
changed. The cadres wanted more detailed reports from the small group 
leaders concerning the students in their groups. The small group lead­
ers were told to take a "progressive" stand on issues and to encourage 
the students to take that stand. 
At the end of each course the students were told to prepare a 
"thought summary," telling how the course had changed their views. 
They were given two days to write their summaries. Each was then re­
quired to read her report to the others in the small group, who were to 
offer criticisms. It was at this point, Lifton feels, that togetherness 
changed to conflict. Shared stories from the more intimate earlier 
period were often brought up in a harshly critical way. Some of the 
students revealed themselves as Communist Youth Corps or Party members, 
and they let it be known that they had been closely observing all that 
had gone on. The students realized that there were two channels of 
information going to the school administration—the group leaders and 
the young Communists—each reporting on the other. To ensure that the 
tone of the small group did not remain uncritical nor unemotional, 
21 
certain activist students were switched from group to group. 
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During this "conflict" stage at the universities, confessions 
became the chief occupation. Large meetings, small meetings, conversa­
tions—all revolved around one's own or another's confession of past 
offenses against "the people." Tremendous pressure was generated within 
participants to clear themselves of identification with "old" China. 
Lifton describes the small groups at this stage as "a complicated blend 
of eager analysis, cautious orthodoxy, covert personal antagonism, and 
beleaguered cooperation." 
At times a person with an extremely offensive history was asked 
to make a public confession before the entire student body. This was 
considered a sign of willingness to give up pride, and it also served 
to encourage others to confess for lesser offenses they had been con­
cealing. 
A less positive public meeting was the "struggle," during which 
a person considered almost beyond saving was put before the student 
body to be insultingly denounced. It was made clear that his or her 
future was not secure unless he or she changed quickly and radically. 
When romances between the sexes occurred, the small groups would 
discuss these on the basis of whether they were furthering the thought 
reform of the two involved people. If it was felt the relationship was 
not helpful, the couple would be advised to end it. In general, sexual 
liaisons were seen as a distraction from the purpose of the university 
and discouraged. 
During their stay at the universities, students were asked not 
to leave the grounds. Evenings were spent reading or in meetings. 
Sundays were unscheduled, but were generally used to finish assignments. 
Periodically there was entertainment—movies, plays, singing, and 
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dancing—which always had Communist ideological content. The schedule 
was full and exhausting, and the internal tension generated during this 
middle stage caused nervous disorders in many students, such as loss of 
appetite and inability to sleep. 
After five months, students were told to write their final con­
fessions. This began the third stage of the revolutionary university 
program. The confession was to include a history, beginning with the 
grandparents' generation. It was to describe their background and the 
development of their thoughts and actions. They were to denounce their 
fathers and their class origin, and to analyze the effect of the revo­
lutionary university on their lives. The confession had to be approved 
before the students could graduate. It was rumored that those who did 
not cooperate might have to repeat the program, or possibly be sent to 
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a labor prison. 
Lifton refers to the third stage as the "new harmony," because 
the process of final submission seemed to be followed by a sense of 
having been cleansed and accepted into the new order of things. 
At the end of the final month students filled out cards as to 
job preference. Job assignments were a matter of great concern, for 
each individual could see how she was regarded by the Communists. Many 
were sent to the countryside to work with the peasants as a means of 
"furthering their re-education." Although intellectuals generally did 
not care to be uprooted and sent to the countryside, it looked bad on 
their records to refuse such assignments. When the students reached 
their new job assignments, they were often required to go through more 
23 
programs similar to that in the revolutionary universities. 
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The revolutionary imiversities were discontinued in 1952 and 
replaced by more conventional Marxist-Leninist cadre-training centers.2^ 
During the time of the Thought Reform Campaign, several other 
campaigns were also occurring. Among these were an army enlistment cam­
paign, a campaign against Japanese rearmament, a campaign against Ameri-
2 5 
can imperialism, and a mass hygiene campaign. Two bureaucratic recti­
fication campaigns, the "Three-anti" and "Five-anti" movements, also 
occurred. 
The "Three-anti" Campaign was against corruption, waste, and 
bureaucratism in the government administration that the Party had in­
herited from the KMT. The campaign encouraged the placement of as many 
cadres as possible in that administration, and the experts who were 
retained were required to publicly denounce their pasts and confess 
their failings. The "Five-anti" Campaign was aimed at the middle-
class business people, merchants, and manufacturers. The "five-antis" 
were bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of state assets, and the leaking 
27 
of state economic secrets. 
In 19^2-1953 a massive educational reform program was also 
launched. Fifty million peasants attended literacy classes. Many new 
28 
schools and universities were established in the cities, and the 
study programs of existing schools and universities were greatly re-
29 
structured. 
All of the campaigns generated huge public participation. Pub­
lic confessions became a commonplace. Many people were sent to labor 
30 
prisons. 
The Communists had four types of prisons, which they referred to 
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as "re-education centers." These were Detention Houses, for Western 
prisoners; Juvenile Delinquent Institutes; regular prisons; and Reform 
31 
Through Labor camps. The Detention Centers for Westerners involved 
an even more intense type of group participation and study than was 
32 
found in the revolutionary universities. The small groups participa­
tion lasted between ten and sixteen hours a day. Sometimes Westerners 
were sent to regular prisons, where thought reform and labor were com-
33 
bined. ^ The labor camps included two types of prisoner, those unde:i>-
going three-year terms of Education Through Labor and those undergoing 
life terms of Reform Through Labor. There are many different estimates 
of the number of people who were sent to labor camps; given China's 
enormous population, it is likely that there were many millions. 
These camps were an extension of the traditional Chinese labor camps, 
35 
and provided a huge labor pool for public works projects such as dams. 
The camps mainly involved long days of exhausting physical labor. 
Though conditions were harsh, there was much less demand for emotional 
37 
involvement than in the other types of prisons. 
Prior to a major prison rectification in 1952-1953> physical 
coercion was common in the prisons. It was officially condemned at that 
O 
time and largely ended. 
In the schools, thought reform was more a matter of political 
education and reeducation. Lifton provides an account of how the various 
campaigns affected one teenager who was attending a Protestant middle 
school. The student told Lifton that when the CCP took power some of 
his schoolmates were enthusiastic about the victory, and others were 
suspicious. Nearly all felt ambivalent about the KMT, for although 
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they had witnessed KMT abuses, they had also regarded that party as their 
government. 
Thought reform was called "political study" in the school, and 
was introduced gradually. It took the form of regular political classes 
and small group sessions for criticism and self-criticism. Political 
instructors were chosen from the faculty. The small groups at first met 
two hours a day, though not every day. Political study consisted largely 
of reading and discussing CCP material, with related lectures. The tone 
of the classes was fairly emotional, with much appeal to the students' 
sense of "conscience.11 
The mass campaigns against Japanese rearmament, against U.Sa 
imperialism, and for army enlistment aroused much interest in the school. 
The "Accuse Japan" campaign, especially, was deeply emotional, for the 
students could remember their own experiences of fear of the Japanese. 
A three-day meeting took place, denouncing Japanese aggression in China. 
Many students "spoke bitterness" against the Japanese, and anger was 
expressed toward the United States as well. 
The "Enlist for the Army" Campaign, which lasted for one month, 
put a lot of pressure on students to be willing to sign up. Students 
who did enlist were praised, and students who held back were criticized. 
Many meetings and small groups were held to discuss the importance of 
enlisting. 
This same student entered the University of Peking after middle 
school and found a similar, although more intense, environment. Criti­
cism and self-criticism in the small groups was even more personal. 
The student told of the "Three-anti" Campaign of 1951-1952. The sequence 
of events was standard: an announcement by Mao, newspaper editorials 
discussing the purposes and methods of the campaign, and meetings 
throughout China to prepare for it. At the University of Peking large 
posters were put up everywhere, and loudspeakers were heard throughout 
the campus. A two-month period was set aside for the campaign, and 
vacations and classes were cancelled. Administrators, faculty, and 
staff were detained and pressured to confess past activities. The 
"Three-anti" Campaign merged with the Thought Reform Campaign, and 
students openly criticized faculty. 
An "Honesty and Frankness" movement occurred as part of the 
Thought Reform Campaign. Students were told to criticize themselves, 
though they were reassured that their bad behavior had been compelled 
by the old system. They were asked to denounce their families, which 
for the students, as for most intellectuals raised with the concept of 
filial piety, was extremely painful. A second campaign against the 
United States resulted when the U.S. was accused of using germ warfare. 
It was accompanied by a mass campaign for good hygiene, in which the 
students participated by working on the University sewage and drainage 
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systems. 
According to the students Lifton interviewed, most young Chin­
ese intellectuals accepted the CCP perspective willingly.^ Many went, 
at Mao's urging, to work in the country among the peasants after 1953^ 
As were all areas of life in China, the arts were greatly af­
fected by the Communist regime. Ongoing national debate concerning 
the arts reflected the tensions between the "two lines" within the 
Party leadership. A film about the Boxer Rebellion was shown in 1950. 
The Propaganda Department and Liu Shao-chi praised the film. Mao and 
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his wife, Chiang Ching, criticized it for portraying the Chinese peasants 
as cruel barbarians and the Ch'ing emperor as a noble hero. Another 
film, Life of Wu Hsun, was shown in 1951• It portrayed a kindly beggar 
who devoted his life to helping others. Mao criticized it for being a 
confused and unhistorical promotion of Confucian principles. 
The disagreements grew in intensity in 1954-. A critical essay, 
Study of "Dream of the Red Chamber," was published by a famous historian. 
Two young writers wrote a criticism of it, which they attempted to have 
published in a national newspaper. When no major paper accepted it, they 
had it published in a university magazine. Mao happened to read it, 
liked it, and asked why it had not received national attention. The 
response was that "two nobodies" had written it. Mao was furious with 
this attitude, and he called upon all cultural workers to thoroughly 
examine their ideas. This resulted in much criticism and self-criticism 
among cultural workers, and in much criticism of contemporary literature 
These tensions came to a head in 1954-1955# En Peng, a writer 
and a Communist Party member, presented the Central Committee with a 
report blaming bureaucratic authoritarianism for the lack of good writ­
ing in China. He then proceeded to attack Communism and Mao, asserting 
that writers and workers could never be integrated. He began organizing 
around his beliefs and became widely read in the imiversities. He was 
criticized for his actions, and in 1955 he made a public self-criticism. 
It had apparently been a result of external pressure, however, for imme­
diately afterward he resumed traveling and organizing. This happened 
to coincide with an intra-Party power struggle between the regional and 
the central leadership, and the central leadership became very threatened. 
The Su Fan ("Liquidation of Hidden Counterrevolutionaries") Movement 
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resulted, which amounted to a purge of the entire Chinese bureaucracy. 
It was reported to have been severe, with much indiscriminate killing. 
Mao called for an end to the violence a few months later. The Su Fan 
Movement had caused the investigation of four hundred thousand intel­
lectuals and had yielded forty-five thousand people identified as coun-
) "3 
terrevolutionaries. The Su Fan Movement singled out one regional 
leader, Kao Kang, to be nationally denounced and expelled from the 
CCP.^ 
In general, the intellectuals came to resent the thought reform 
programs and campaigns. As heirs to the Confucian literati, they were 
used to being treated with great respect. Now they were frequently 
treated rudely, spied upon by students or co-workers, and required to 
attend long meetings the content of which invalidated their lives and 
their professions. They were frequently forced to make public and humil-
45 
iating confessions of "crimes" they did not consider to be crimes. 
The increasing lack of enthusiasm on the part of the intellectuals 
was a cause of concern for the regime, which needed their active support. 
In 1955-1956 Premier Chou En-lai investigated the situation. Party con­
ferences on the reform progress of intellectuals were held, and Chou 
reported that about 40 percent of the intellectuals actively supported 
the regime, 40 percent were non-active supporters, and over 10 percent 
were opposed to the regime. The remainder were apparently active counter­
revolutionaries. ̂  He stated that he believed the passive and negative 
attitudes had been caused by "crude" thought reform methods, and he asked 
that in future programs intellectuals be treated with greater patience 
and gentleness, as long as they did not actively oppose the Communists' 
) 7 
goals. He also announced that living and working conditions for the 
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intellectuals would be improved. He asked that in return the intellec­
tuals devote eight hours of their forty-eight hour work weeks to polit-
I O 
ical study and activities. 
The conditions of the intellectuals were improved, and within 
two years six hundred thousand had joined the Party. Han Suyin contends 
that this acceptance of so many intellectuals reflected a "capricious" 
attempt by Mao's opponents to strengthen their position within the 
Party leadership, for many of those admitted to the Party were not 
Ji9 
really committed to Party ideology. Mao, in the meantime, continued 
to caution that the revolution had barely begun, and that class rela­
tions would continue in people's minds even though economic conditions 
were changing.^ 
In May of 1956, in an unpublished speech at a Party Congress, 
Mao called for a renewal of political discussion and debate throughout 
China. He encouraged that it be modeled after an ancient Chinese cul­
tural renaissance, in which one hundred schools of philosophy had 
flourished: "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of 
5l 
thought contend." One idea behind this announcement was apparently 
to provide an outlet for non-Party intellectuals to express any stored-
up grievances against the Party—hopefully to clear the air and permit 
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better relationships —thus consolidating the new system. It was 
not, however, meant to encourage free speech in the liberal sense. 
KU 
It assumed loyalty to the regime and wanted constructive criticism. 
Confusion over what Mao meant, combined with the painful memory 
of the recent Su Fan Movement, caused many intellectuals to hesitate to 
speak up. Further complicating things was an event that aroused great 
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disturbance in China: the speech by Khrushchev denouncing Stalin. 
Students learned of the repression of Stalin largely by accident, for 
the government was suppressing the information. An article was found 
in a library in a Communist newspaper from New York, the only U.S. news­
paper available to Chinese students. Word spread rapidly. Stalin had 
been held up as a benevolent leader by the CCP leadership, and his writ­
ings were regularly included in political courses. That he was not 
"democratic" and had murdered so many people greatly shocked the Chin-
56 
ese. 
During the summer of 1956, student unrest and factory strikes 
concerned Party leadership. In addition, the agricultural cooperatives, 
which had greatly increased in number, were having problems. Mao blamed 
these various difficulties on an unresponsive bureaucracy and on inade­
quate political education programs for the people. He called for a 
Party rectification campaign and for a socialist education movement in 
the rural areas. Both suggestions met with resistance within the Party, 
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and no significant changes occurred. 
Early in 1956 Mao made a speech, "On the Correct Handling of 
Contradictions Among the People," which again encouraged criticism of 
the Party. He reiterated his belief that people had the right to say 
whatever they felt about the government and the Party, as long as criti­
cism was constructive, as befit close allies, and not destructive, as 
58 
between class enemies. 
The Hungarian Uprising in late 1956 convinced Mao that another 
political education campaign was essential. He feared that conserva­
tives in China might similarly try to take power. Many Party leaders 
still resisted, some feeling that such a campaign should occur, but 
only within the Party, closed to public participation. Mao disagreed, 
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saying that it would be a way to unify the people while cleaning up the 
Party.^ 
The Hundred Flowers Movement, which finally did occur in 1957 > 
was apparently a genuine attempt at liberalization of expression in 
China. It was to be friendly, without "struggles" or mass meetings. 
Its format was to be mainly small discussion groups, where people would 
be able to say what they felt about the national and international Com­
munist Party. This call for gentle criticism, however, unleashed a 
flood of bitterness and rage from the intellectual community. They 
criticized the Party, Party methods of governing, the Party1s totali­
tarian uses of power, the growing privileges granted Party members. 
Even Mao was attacked. Some called for a multi-party system with free 
elections. Newspapers were criticized for being mouthpieces of the 
Party. Many intellectuals struck out at thought reform processes as 
well, saying they were exercises in humiliation rather than education. 
In universities, "democratic walls" were designated, areas set aside 
specifically for criticism of the regime and of the university bureau­
cracy. Students complained of Party control over course topics and job 
assignments. They called for free speech and new expression of freedom 
and democracy. The posting of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech triggered 
riots in some cities, during which students attacked Party members and 
destroyed Party property.^ 
Apparently the outburst from the intellectual community caught 
the Party leadership completely off-guard and left them temporarily con­
fused. The criticism continued for six weeks, during which the Party 
media nervously expressed approval for the enthusiasm of the response, 
but expressed concern over the tone of the criticisms.^ Meanwhile, 
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posters supportive of the Party were often torn down, and workers and 
students of peasant "background who wanted to speak in praise of the 
Party were prevented from doing so and sometimes beaten up. Some Party 
cadres were murdered.^2 
After six weeks the Party leadership apparently recovered from 
their shock and retaliated angrily. They called for rectification of 
the critics and announced an "Anti-Rightist" Campaign. The Party leader­
ship had concluded that the criticisms of thought reform indicated a 
need for more of it, and decided that refresher courses should be re­
quired at regular intervals. The brief attempt at liberalization was 
replaced with the old methods of thought reform of intellectuals. Cri­
tics of the regime began confessing their errors. The intellectuals 
were once again treated with scorn. They were ridiculed and insulted 
and some were sent to work in the countryside for further "reeducation." 
The Party felt that students at Peking University were especially 
responsible for student agitation, and it was made known that graduates 
would be closely examined in terms of their activities and attitudes 
during the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Records of this information would 
be kept on file and be used as a basis of future job assignments. Some 
students were placed under surveillance and a few were sent to prison. 
Many older intellectuals were also sent to prison, and over sixty top 
government and Party officials were removed from office. 
Soon after the Anti-Rightist Campaign, Mao launched the "Great 
Leap Forward." Its purpose was to industrialize China and to further 
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the political education of the Chinese people. All of the Chinese 
population poured enthusiasm and energy into various new programs. 
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"People's communes" spread throughout the country. Mao asked that aca­
demic education be mixed with manual labor, and that schools and uni­
versities become as self-sufficient as possible. Millions of cadres and 
students and other intellectuals volunteered or were sent to work in the 
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communes and factories and on large construction projects. A massive 
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health campaign was also launched. 
Women were strongly encouraged to participate in production, 
which motivated them to find new ways of living. Often they joined to­
gether to form production teams, working as a group in each others' 
homes. One would volunteer to do child-care as her share of the labor. 
Another would offer to do all the cooking. This sort of division of 
labor had already been established in the factories. Payment for work 
was now made directly to the women, which contributed greatly to their 
prestige within their families. Communal dining rooms, nurseries, kin­
dergartens , and homes for elders flourished, freeing more and more women 
to actively participate in social and political life. The communes were 
never viewed as a substitute for the family, but the women did experi-
68 
ence a new freedom from rigid roles. 
In spite of these contributions, however, the Great Leap For­
ward had many negative results. Many poorly advised agricultural and 
engineering experiments failed. Many officials grossly abused the enthu­
siasm of the workers and peasants and pushed them to the point of ex-
69 
haustion. A massive steel-making campaign was initiated, its purpose 
70 
to teach the Chinese people to be self-sufficient, which resulted m 
the construction of thousands of small, homemade steel-making furnaces. 
The people did receive an education in basic steel-making, but the drive 
was an economic disaster.7"*" 
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Stanley Karnow refers to the Great Leap Forward as "an abortive 
experiment" that "plunged the Chinese people back into the kind of 
poverty they had begun to forget, making them increasingly cynical and 
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apathetic.' Mao blamed the failure of the Great Leap Forward on 
"inexperience, waste and bad organization" in the lower levels of the 
73 
CCP. Other Party leaders would not accept this explanation, however, 
and held Mao largely responsible. 
For various reasons, Mao resigned from his position as Chairman 
of the Republic in 1959 > although he retained his positions as chairman 
rr I 
of the Party and of the Military Affairs Committee. He was replaced 
by Liu Shao-chi. 
Afterword 
Mao's influence continued to be strongly felt in China, of 
course. Increasingly concerned with what appeared to be the growth of 
a new privileged class in China, in 1965 Mao launched the Great Prole­
tarian Cultural Revolution. He urged the Chinese people to rebel against 
entrenched Party bureaucracies. The tumult that resulted shook China to 
its roots. Party members with different perceptions of the meaning of 
socialist revolution confronted each other, all "waving the flagj1 of Mao 
Tse-tung. All utilized at least some of the methods of thought reform 
developed in the preceding years. Rallies, meetings, posters, mass 
campaigns, small groups, special schools, public criticisms and confes­
sions, and massive mobilization of young people—all became more familiar 
than ever to the Chinese people. 
New to the Cultural Revolution was the extent to which young 
people were mobilized. Hundreds of thousands of Red Guards went from 
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city to country and back again, carrying quotations from Chairman Mao 
and challenging local Party administrators. 
Reports vary and conflict over the facts of the Cultural Revo-
75 
lution, but all seem to agree that it affected all the Chinese people 
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CHAPTER VI 
THOUGHT REFORM AMD HUMAN CHANGE 
Thought reform for everyone was painful, to some extent. It 
involved, after all, a deliberate and total shake-up of the traditions 
and values and norms that made up each person's world view. For the 
peasants and workers, however, it was part of a total process of change 
which nurtured their participation, validated them as human beings, and 
on the whole enormously improved their living conditions. 
For the intellectuals and wealthy classes, thought reform was 
generally a negative experience that generated hostility and resentment, 
even among those who had at first celebrated Communist victories. In 
spite of the official position that the privileged status of these 
people was the enemy, and not the people themselves, in actual prac­
tice this proved too difficult a distinction for many. Mao admitted in 
195>7> for example, that in the first five years after the 191+9 revolu­
tion, many excesses had occurred and over eight hundred thousand people 
had been executed. 
Robert Lifton, the psychoanalyst who interviewed many Chinese 
and Western intellectuals who had experienced and fled from thought 
reform, concluded that thought reform in itself was an excess. He 
describes it as an exercise in "ideological totalism," which he describes 
as "the coming together of immoderate ideology with equally immoderate 
2 
character traits—an extremist meeting ground between people and ideas." 
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Lifton admits that any ideology (i.e., "any set of emotionally-charged 
convictions about man and his relationship to the natural and super­
natural world")—whether religious, political, scientific, or psycho­
logical—can be abused by those who practice it, but he feels that 
"messianic" ideologies, in which he includes Communism, are most sus-
3 
ceptible. 
While Lifton closely examines the negative implications of 
thought reform for human change, Thomas Scheff, a sociologist concerned 
with mental health, examines some positive aspects.^ Like many of his 
contemporaries, Scheff has observed that the treatment of mental illness 
is largely ineffective when done in isolation; when the "patient" re­
turns to the social environment that generated the distress, the dis­
tress reaccumulates. Scheff has also observed that emotional catharsis 
(through tears, laughter, shaking, talking, raging) seems to accompany 
£ 
and facilitate psychological healing. Scheff has concluded that for 
social change attempts to be effective, there must be "communication 
that allows for emotional release, on the one hand, and for the creation 
of a group in which there is strong social solidarity and which will 
help sustain the changes, on the other." 
Scheff suggests that the Communists may have hit upon some 
psychological practices that did in fact contribute to long-term change. 
He mentions three: the "speak bitterness" meetings, the use of theater, 
and the treatment of mental illness in China. 
In the "speak bitterness" meetings, individuals were allowed to 
pour out their rage and grief in a group setting, receiving recognition 
through being heard, through being reassured that their grief and rage 
were justifiable emotions, and through hearing that there were self-
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affirming ways out of their sorrows. The others in the meetings were 
also affected, each drawing closer to others in the group as they became 
aware of their common anguish. 
Theater also contributed to the release of repressed emotions 
in a social setting. William Hinton described the impact that theater 
could have on the peasants: 
As the tragedy of [a] poor peasant's family unfolded, the 
women around me wept openly and unashamedly. On every side 
as I turned to look tears were coursing down their faces. 
No one sobbed, no one cried out but all wept together in 
silence. The agony on the stage seemed to have unlocked a 
thousand painful memories, a bottomless reservoir of suffertv 
ing that no one could control . . . the women, huddled one 
against the other in their dark padded jackets, shuddered as 
if stirred by a gust of wind . . . abruptly the music stopped, 
the silence on the stage was broken only by the chirping of 
a cricket. At that moment I became aware of a new quality in 
the reaction of the audience. Men were weeping and I along 
with them.7 
Edgar Snow also describes the importance of the Red Theater to the Chin-
g 
ese peasants, and the ways in which it provided emotional release. 
Scheff1s third example is the current treatment of mental ill-
9 
ness in China. Although this paper has not dealt with that topic, 
that treatment contains elements of the "speak bitterness" meetings and 
the "small groups." Among other things, individuals tell what they 
have suffered and criticize their own role in that suffering, both of 
which often result in emotional catharsis. As the individuals in the 
groups learn to articulate their pain (in the common language of Com­
munist ideology), they develop "transitional communities of support" 
that facilitate the maintenance of individual and group changes."*"^ 
The whole question of the usage of Marxist jargon in thought 
reform is highly controversial. It is apparently nearly mandatory for 
people to learn to phrase political opinions in what Victor Li calls 
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the "ritual language" of Communism. Li gives an example of how dissent­
ing opinions need to be phrased: 
[A person] would not say: "I think the government leaders are 
badly misinformed if they believe that present retirement pro­
grams are sufficiently developed that we do not have to depend 
on our children in our old age." He would say instead, "I, 
too, want to do what is best for my family and my country. I 
realize that my ideas may be erroneous, and hope that my com­
rades will help me think these questions through. But for the 
following reasons I do not think we should be carrying out a 
planned birth program—" and then egress his views fully and 
vigorously.il 
Li believes that in spite of the limitations of ritual language, it 
allows for a good measure of political discussion and debate. 
Lifton is not so accommodating of the "all-encompassing" jargon, 
12 
the "thought-terminating cliche." While admitting that all groups 
have some sort of jargon which permits verbal shortcuts, he feels that 
13 
the Communists carry the jargon to rigid extremes: 
The most far-reaching and complex of human problems are com­
pressed into brief, highly reductive, definitive-sounding 
phrases, easily memorized and easily expressed. These become 
the start and finish of any ideological analysis. In thought 
reform . . . the phrase "bourgeois mentality" is used to en­
compass and critically dismiss ordinarily troublesome concerns 
like the quest for individual expression, the exploration of 
alternative ideas, and the search for perspective and balance 
in political judgments.^ 
Simon Leys agrees, and ascribes malicious intent to the Commun­
ists: "The aim is to anesthetize critical intelligence, purge the brain, 
15 
and inject the cement of official ideology into the emptied skull . . . 
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, feelings about what has 
occurred in China run very high. 
Another area of Western debate concerning thought reform is the 
use of the small groups. Victor Li cautions against making Western 
assumptions about Chinese experiences: what may appear oppressively 
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group-dominated to a United States' citizen is not necessarily regarded 
as such by a Chinese citizen. While citizens from both countries con­
sider individual and social concerns important, Li observes that his­
torical developments have given individual concerns priority in the 
United States, and social concerns priority in China. Throughout Chin­
ese history, people have been tied spiritually, economically, and cul­
turally to their family villages. Group action and decision-making 
have been routine, and individual survival has often depended on group 
cooperation."^ In regard to the small group system, Li sees both 
advantages and disadvantages. As a lawyers he appreciates the public 
participation and the political awareness it affords all Chinese. He 
feels that the small groups, properly conducted, can provide an ongoing 
supportive environment. He admits, however, that the small group sys­
tem offers little protection to the individual if it is improperly 
conducted, that is, if one's small group behaves in a way that is 
unfair. 
Conclusion 
Was thought reform a "drawing out" or a "putting in," education 
or indoctrination? The information researched for this paper indicates 
that it was both. Fanshen, in which Hinton tells of thought reform 
among the peasants, and Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism 
by Lifton provide good examples of what was and was not effective in 
terms of bringing about the kinds of internal change desired by the 
Communists. The anti-hierarchical restructuring of the Army; the 
fairly consistent commitment to discussion and debate; the respect for 
the peasants shown by the Army and by "mass line" politics; the 
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encouragement of women1s liberation; the attempts at consensual deci­
sion-making; the making available of a vernacular written language— 
all seem to have had results desired by the Communists, all indicated 
a willingness by the Communists to listen and learn from, as well as 
teach, the Chinese people. On the other hand, the thought reform 
methods that played on guilt feelings; that demanded ritual language; 
that forced unthinking mouthing of Communist ideology; that humiliated 
instead of affirmed the human being, regardless of class origin—all of 
these resembled indoctrination, a one-sided "putting in" of information. 
These appear to have been imposed most heavily on the intellectuals. 
Was thought reform successful? Did it bring about political 
consciousness and class awareness that thought reform proponents desired? 
The works cited in this study indicate that, at least through the years 
prior to the CCP victory and immediately thereafter, it often did, par-
ticularly among the younger intellectuals and the peasants and indus­
trial workers. Among the older intellectuals it apparently did not 
bring about the changes in thinking hoped for by the Communists. 
One can only speculate on the reason for the communication dif­
ficulties between the Communists and the intellectuals. An obvious 
reason was that many intellectuals had enjoyed their privileged status 
and resisted, actively and passively, Communist attempts to change the 
order of things. Another more subtle but perhaps more divisive reason 
was probably that feelings of inferiority on the part of cadres of 
peasant origin collided with feelings of superiority on the part of 
intellectuals, both within the Party and in the larger society, making 
it difficult for either group to think clearly about the other. 
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One way to gauge the success of thought reform objectives will 
be to observe China in the near future. The Communist leaders who suc­
ceeded Mao are apparently more concerned with economic development than 
with political education of the type Mao promoted. It is as yet unclear 
what changes will occur in China with the new openness in that country 
to Western corporate capitalism. 
The strengths and weaknesses of thought reform will eventually 
be described by the Chinese people themselves. For the present, much 
remains to be understood, not only because thought reform has pro­
foundly affected one-fourth of the world's people, but because it has 
grappled with some of the major political problems of modern times. 
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